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ABSTRACT
Fiscal policy choices have a particularly 
signiﬁ   cant impact on economic performance 
in oil-exporting countries, owing to the 
importance of the oil sector in the economy 
and the fact that in most countries oil revenues 
accrue to the government. At the same time, 
ﬁ   scal policy in oil-centred economies is 
facing speciﬁ   c challenges, both in the long 
run, as regards intergenerational equity and 
ﬁ   scal sustainability, and in the short run, as 
regards macroeconomic stabilisation and ﬁ  scal 
planning. Institutional responses to the speciﬁ  c 
ﬁ   scal challenges in oil-exporting countries 
involve conservative oil price assumptions in 
the budget, the establishment of oil stabilisation 
and savings funds and ﬁ   scal rules. Fiscal 
policy in most oil-exporting countries has been 
expansionary over the past years in the wake 
of high oil prices. Fiscal expansion has added 
to inﬂ   ationary pressure, and monetary policy 
has been constrained in tackling inﬂ  ation  as 
a result of prevailing exchange rate regimes. 
While, in this context, ﬁ  scal policy is the major 
tool for macroeconomic stabilisation, it has 
faced competing objectives and considerations. 
Cyclical considerations would have warranted 
ﬁ  scal restraint, but, in times of high oil prices, 
pressures to increase public spending have 
been mounting. Such pressures stem from 
primarily distribution-related considerations, 
development-related spending needs (e.g. in 
the areas of physical and social infrastructure) 
and international considerations in the context 
of, for example, global imbalances. The sharp 
fall in oil prices since mid-2008 has brought 
to the fore a different question – whether oil 
exporters can sustain spending levels reached in 
previous years. 
Key words: ﬁ  scal policy, oil-exporting countries, 
inﬂ  ation, global imbalances
JEL: E62, E63, H30, H60, Q32, Q385
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In the wake of high and rising oil prices from 
the beginning of this decade until mid-2008, 
economic developments and macroeconomic 
policy issues in oil-exporting countries have 
increasingly attracted attention. Because oil 
revenues are large and, in most countries, 
accrue to governments, ﬁ  scal policy choices in 
particular have a signiﬁ  cant impact on economic 
performance with regard to, for example, 
economic growth, inﬂ  ation and current account 
balances, and also have a bearing on advanced 
economies with regard to, for example, the 
recycling of oil revenues via the trade or the 
ﬁ  nancial channel and in the context of global 
imbalances. Fiscal policy in oil-exporting 
countries is facing a number of speciﬁ  c 
challenges, stemming mainly from the fact 
that oil revenues, which constitute the bulk of 
government revenues in oil-centred economies, 
are exhaustible, volatile, uncertain and largely 
originate from external demand. These speciﬁ  c 
features of oil revenues pose challenges in the 
long term with regard to intergenerational equity 
and ﬁ  scal sustainability and in the short term 
with regard to macroeconomic stabilisation and 
ﬁ  scal planning.
Over the past few years, macroeconomic 
developments in oil-exporting countries have 
been broadly favourable, owing to high and 
rising oil prices until mid-2008, and have been 
characterised by buoyant economic growth and 
large current account and ﬁ  scal surpluses. This 
contrasts with relatively weak performance in the 
past, which is often attributed to the “resource 
curse”. While in past decades oil exporters had 
relatively low inﬂ   ation when compared with 
emerging market and developing economies 
in general, rising inﬂ   ationary pressure has 
emerged as a mounting challenge in most 
countries in recent years. Monetary policy has 
been constrained in tackling this challenge as a 
result of the prevailing exchange rate regimes – 
mostly ﬁ  xed pegs or tightly managed ﬂ  oats. This 
has left ﬁ  scal policy to carry the main burden of 
macroeconomic stabilisation.
However, ﬁ  scal policy in oil-exporting countries 
over the past years has been expansionary, 
although this has been masked by high 
ﬁ   scal surpluses, highlighting the competing 
considerations and objectives which ﬁ  scal 
policy has been facing. These are to some 
extent the result of the speciﬁ  c long and short-
term challenges of ﬁ  scal policy in resource-rich 
countries. The major competing considerations 
in the short run have been, on one hand, 
cyclical, i.e. containing inﬂ  ation, which calls for 
ﬁ  scal restraint, and, on the other hand, primarily 
distribution-related considerations (pressures 
to immediately redistribute oil revenues to 
the general population), development-related 
spending needs in, for example, the areas of 
physical and social infrastructure (in view of 
the development level of most oil exporters) 
and international considerations (oil revenue 
recycling, in particular in the context of global 
imbalances), which call for ﬁ  scal  expansion. 
In the longer run, ﬁ   scal restraint and the 
accumulation of ﬁ   nancial assets, i.e. saving 
the bulk of recent windfall revenues, would be 
warranted from an intergenerational and ﬁ  scal 
sustainability point of view, while the drive 
for economic diversiﬁ  cation in many countries 
requires public investment in, for example, 
infrastructure and education. Whether under 
what circumstances ﬁ  nancial assets and physical 
assets can be regarded as substitutes is a key 
issue in this context. Calibrating ﬁ  scal policy 
in view of these considerations and objectives 
has been a major challenge for oil-exporting 
countries over the past few years.
Possible ways to mitigate conﬂ  icts  between 
competing objectives and considerations at a 
time of rising oil prices include improving the 
structure of public spending (i.e. focusing in 
particular on capital spending, which alleviates 
bottlenecks in the economy, while containing 
current expenditure) and optimising the 
phasing of public spending (i.e. prioritising 
capital spending targeted at bottlenecks and 
at enhancing the absorptive capacity of the 
economy). Rebalancing the macroeconomic 
policy mix by tightening monetary policy in 6
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times of buoyant economic growth could also 
help avoid the overburdening of ﬁ  scal policy 
with competing objectives. This would require, 
however, a modiﬁ  cation of prevailing exchange 
rate regimes by allowing for more exchange rate 
ﬂ  exibility. Apart from technical impediments in 
some countries to running a different monetary 
and exchange rate regime, concerns about high 
volatility and “Dutch disease” tends to hold 
back authorities from opting for more exchange 
rate ﬂ  exibility, in particular as oil is priced in 
US dollars in international markets.
Global economic and ﬁ  nancial developments in 
the second half of 2008 and the concomitant fall 
in oil prices have mitigated inﬂ  ationary pressures 
in oil-exporting countries, as elsewhere, and 
thus conﬂ   icts between the competing ﬁ  scal 
objectives. In the short run, the sudden, sharp fall 
in oil prices has brought up a set of new issues, 
in particular as to whether to continue with 
spending programmes initiated over the past 
years or to adjust spending to dampened revenue 
prospects. To the extent that spending has been 
identiﬁ   ed as useful, e.g. for diversifying the 
economy or upgrading infrastructure, continuing 
with spending programmes would help both to 
stabilise the domestic economy and to contribute 
to global stabilisation efforts. Most oil exporters 
are in a position to do so, given that over the 
past years they have brought down public debt 
to low levels and have accumulated – sometimes 
large – foreign assets. These can be used to 
bridge a period of temporarily low oil prices 
and to avoid pro-cyclicality of ﬁ  scal policy, a 
key challenge for ﬁ  scal policy in oil-exporting 
countries in view of large, unpredictable swings 
in oil prices. 
If oil prices were to remain at relatively 
low levels compared to the past few years 
for a protracted period of time, however, 
oil-exporting countries would have to adjust 
ﬁ   scal policy. Such adjustment could take 
place on the expenditure and the revenue side. 
On the expenditure side, current outlays and 
expenditure on marginal investment projects 
could be reduced without impeding longer term 
growth prospects or diversiﬁ  cation efforts. On 
the revenue side, the introduction or expansion 
of taxes could be envisaged to ensure ﬁ  scal 
sustainability. Broadening the revenue basis by 
developing an efﬁ  cient tax system would also 
be beneﬁ  cial over the medium term, reducing 
the dependence of public budgets on oil receipts 
and enhancing the control of authorities over 
public revenues, which so far are largely beyond 
their control.
Institutional responses to the speciﬁ  c challenges 
for  ﬁ   scal policy in oil-exporting countries 
traditionally involve basing budgets on 
conservative oil price assumptions and, more 
recently, the establishment of oil stabilisation 
and savings funds and, in few cases, explicit 
ﬁ  scal rules. While each of these responses has 
its merits and its drawbacks, none is a panacea 
to address the speciﬁ   c long and short-run 
challenges. They can be helpful devices, but 
the desired effects only seem to be realised if 
the quality of a country’s institutions and level 
of governance in general are conducive to 
responsible ﬁ  scal conduct.7
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1   INTRODUCTION
I INTRODUCTION
In the wake of high and rising oil prices from the 
beginning of this decade until mid-2008, 
economic developments and macroeconomic 
policy issues in oil-exporting countries have 
increasingly attracted attention.1 In particular, as 
oil revenues are large and in most countries 
accrue to governments, ﬁ  scal policy choices have 
a signiﬁ  cant impact on economic performance, 
for example with regard to economic growth, 
inﬂ  ation and current account balances, and also 
have a bearing on advanced economies, for 
example with regard to the recycling of oil 
revenues via the trade or the ﬁ  nancial channel 
and in the context of global imbalances. Fiscal 
policy in oil-exporting countries faces a number 
of speciﬁ  c challenges, which mainly stem from 
the fact that oil revenues, which constitute the 
bulk of government revenues in oil-centred 
economies, are exhaustible, volatile, uncertain 
and largely originate from external demand.2 
These speciﬁ   c features of oil revenues pose 
challenges in the long term with regard to 
intergenerational equity and ﬁ  scal sustainability 
and in the short term with regard to 
macroeconomic stabilisation and ﬁ  scal planning. 
The sharp ﬂ  uctuations in oil prices in the course 
of 2008 have highlighted these challenges.
With inﬂ   ation rising in past years in most 
oil-exporting countries and the scope for curbing 
inﬂ   ationary pressure through monetary policy 
being constrained in view of the prevailing ﬁ  xed 
exchange rate pegs or tightly managed ﬂ  oats, 
ﬁ  scal policy has been the main macroeconomic 
tool available to control inﬂ  ation. At the same 
time, governments were facing various pressures 
to increase spending, given buoyant revenue 
growth and high ﬁ  scal surpluses, highlighting the 
short-term challenges. Governments have been 
confronted with the choice of saving the windfall 
revenues resulting from high oil prices or 
increasing expenditure, e.g. on physical and social 
infrastructure. In the short run this choice has 
cyclical implications for the domestic economy 
and international implications with regard to the 
pattern of oil revenue recycling. It also directly 
relates to the long-term ﬁ   scal challenge, as 
the implications for intergenerational resource 
allocation and ﬁ   scal sustainability depend on 
the expected returns from accumulated ﬁ  nancial 
assets versus returns from public capital 
expenditure. The sharp fall in oil prices since 
mid-2008 in the wake of the intensiﬁ  cation of 
the global ﬁ  nancial turmoil and its fallout on the 
global economy has brought to the fore the issue 
of how to react to sudden and large swings in 
oil prices, i.e. whether to “see past” this fall as a 
temporary deviation from a longer term upward 
trend in oil prices, or to change ﬁ  scal policy and 
adjust expenditure to lower levels.
This paper examines the ﬁ  scal policy challenges 
for oil-centred economies over the past few 
years in general, focusing on developments 
in four major oil-exporting countries in EU 
neighbouring regions: Algeria, Nigeria, Russia 
and Saudi Arabia. These four countries are 
among the world’s top ten net oil exporters, 
with Saudi Arabia and Russia being the top 
two. They represent a variety of experiences 
in different regions (Algeria/North Africa, 
Nigeria/Sub-Saharan Africa, Russia/CIS and 
Saudi Arabia/GCC). They differ with regard 
to key characteristics, such as population 
size and population growth, size of economy 
and GDP per capita, but share the feature of 
a high economic and ﬁ   scal dependency on 
hydrocarbons, as measured by the share of the 
oil sector in GDP and the share of oil in total 
government revenues and exports (Table 1).3
In this paper, the term “oil-exporting countries” generally refers  1 
to the top ten net oil-exporting countries for which oil and gas 
account for more than 40% of total exports, i.e. the countries 
that are most relevant to global energy markets and at the same 
time share the feature of being highly dependent on hydrocarbon 
exports. These countries are: Algeria, Iran, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, 
Norway, Russia, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) 
and Venezuela. The paper looks more closely at four of these 
countries, Algeria, Nigeria, Russia and Saudi Arabia (see below).
These features and the resulting macroeconomic and, in  2 
particular, ﬁ  scal challenges apply to all non-renewable natural 
resources, i.e. also to countries dependent on commodities such 
as copper, diamonds etc. This paper focuses on hydrocarbon
(oil and gas) dependent economies, referring to other resource-
rich economies where relevant.
Hydrocarbon dependency refers to oil and gas. Among the  3 
four countries under consideration, Algeria and Russia have 
considerable gas resources. As the macroeconomic issues do 
not differ signiﬁ  cantly between oil and gas dependency, this text 
does not differentiate between the two commodities and uses the 
term “oil” only for the sake of simplicity.8
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The remainder of this paper is structured as 
follows: Section 2 reviews the economic and 
ﬁ  scal performance in the four countries under 
consideration over a longer period. Section 3 
analyses key ﬁ  scal policy challenges stemming 
from commodity dependency, differentiating 
between general challenges and speciﬁ  c 
challenges experienced over the past few years 
in view of high oil prices, and most recently, the 
sudden, sharp fall in oil prices. Section 4 
discusses institutional responses to these 
challenges in the four countries. Section 5 
concludes.4
Analysis in the paper is based on IMF WEO data of October 2008.  4 
Financial market data is taken into account up to December 2008.
Table 1 Key characteristics of selected oil-exporting countries in 2007
Algeria Nigeria Russia Saudi Arabia
Population (million) 34.4 143.9 142.1 24.3
Population growth (2000-2007 average, % p.a.) 1.7 2.8 -0.5 2.5
Nominal GDP (USD billion) 134 167 1,290 382
GDP per capita (USD, PPP terms) 6,539 2,028 14,705 22,852
Oil sector  1) (percentage of GDP) 45.9 35.0 20.0  2) 54.4
Oil revenues  1) (percentage of total gov. rev.) 78.1 77.4 27.9 87.5
Oil exports  1) (percentage of total exports) 93.9 84.2 44.1 85.0
Source: IMF. 
1) Oil data include gas, data for Algeria refer to 2006 and for the rest of the countries the data are 2007 estimates. 
2) World Bank estimate for 2000.9
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2  ECONOMIC AND FISCAL PERFORMANCE
IN SELECTED OIL-EXPORTING COUNTRIES
As ﬁ  scal developments have to be seen against 
the background of general economic 
developments, sub-section 1 reviews the 
development of some key macroeconomic 
indicators – real GDP growth, GDP per capita, 
current account balances and inﬂ  ation – of the 
selected countries since 1980. It thus covers a 
relatively long period with episodes of low and 
high oil prices and considerable oil price 
ﬂ  uctuations.5 Developments in Algeria, Nigeria, 
Russia and Saudi Arabia are discussed with a 
view to two benchmarks: oil-exporting countries 
as a narrow benchmark, comprising countries 
that share the feature of hydrocarbon 
dependency, and emerging market and 
developing economies (EMEs) as a broad 
benchmark, comprising countries that are at 
similar stages of economic development but not, 
in general, dominated by commodities.6 In a 
similar vein, sub-section 2 looks at longer-term 
developments in key ﬁ  scal indicators, so as to 
put recent developments into perspective. To 
this end, it reviews the development of 
government balances, public debt and 
government revenue and expenditure.
The key results in the long-term perspective are: 
1) economic growth in oil-exporting countries 
has been below average levels in emerging 
markets; only with the rise of oil prices since 
the beginning of the decade until mid-2008 has 
their growth performance became more dynamic 
and caught up with non-oil-exporting emerging 
markets; 2) current account balances have been 
more volatile than the average for emerging 
market economies, with large surpluses over the 
past few years; 3) for a long time inﬂ  ation was 
generally below levels in emerging markets, 
but over the past few years it has signiﬁ  cantly 
picked up and exceeded the emerging market 
average; 4) oil exporters’ ﬁ  scal developments 
have been characterised by volatile budget 
balances, with large surpluses over the past 
few years, leading to rapidly declining public 
debt, which had previously reached high levels 
in several countries; 5) government revenue 
is generally higher than in non-oil-exporting 
emerging market economies and has been 
rising further since the beginning of the decade; 
and 6) public expenditure is also somewhat 
higher than the average for emerging markets.
2.1 ECONOMIC  PERFORMANCE
REAL GDP GROWTH AND GDP PER CAPITA
Real GDP growth of oil-exporting countries 
has been below levels in emerging market 
economies, except at times of relatively high 
oil prices, such as in the early 1980s, following 
the second oil shock of 1979, in 1990/1991, 
due to a spike in oil prices resulting from 
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and since the 
beginning of this decade, mainly as a result of 
surging demand for oil from emerging market 
economies. Even at such times their growth 
rates have barely matched and hardly ever 
exceeded those of emerging market economies 
(Chart 1). Average real GDP growth since 1981 
was 2.6% p.a., compared with 4.2% in emerging 
market economies, conﬁ   rming evidence that 
natural resource-rich countries tend to grow 
at a slower pace than countries endowed with 
fewer or no natural resources. This is known as 
the “resource curse” (see Box 1 on theory and 
evidence). Economic growth has also been more 
volatile than in emerging market economies 
in general.
Among the four countries under consideration, 
average annual economic growth was highest in 
Nigeria at 4.4%, possibly reﬂ  ecting its very low 
While it may have been interesting to look further back into  5 
the 1970s, including the ﬁ  rst oil price shock of 1973, a lack of 
comprehensive, consistent and comparable data would have 
made such a review problematic.
The benchmark “oil-exporting countries” comprises the top  6 
ten net oil-exporting countries for which oil and gas account 
for above 40% of total exports (see footnote 1). As the four 
countries selected for closer consideration in this paper are part 
of this group and include Russia, which is by far the largest 
economy among the top ten net oil exporters, they strongly 
inﬂ  uence the average. The benchmark “emerging and developing 
economies” comprises 142 countries in accordance with the IMF 
classiﬁ  cation. The countries under closer consideration and the 
top ten net oil exporters – with the exception of Norway – form 
part of this group, but owing to the large number of countries, the 
majority of which are not hydrocarbon-dependent economies, 
they do not strongly inﬂ  uence the average for the group.10
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starting level, with the by far lowest GDP per 
capita among oil exporters. Average growth was 
low in Russia 7 and Saudi Arabia, at 1.8% and 
2% respectively. In the case of Russia, this 
reﬂ  ects, in particular, the deep recession at the 
beginning of the economic transition in the early 
1990s and, to a lesser extent, the ﬁ  nancial crisis 
of 1998. Saudi Arabia faced a deep recession 
from 1982 to 1985 following the sharp drop in 
oil prices in the ﬁ   rst half of the 1980s, and 
growth remained sluggish until the rise in oil 
prices after 2003, apart from a few exceptional 
years like 1990-91. Algeria has a somewhat 
better average annual growth at 2.9%, although 
it was hampered by, among other things, 
political unrest after 1992. Oil-exporting 
countries in general and the four countries under 
consideration in particular are also characterised 
by a relatively volatile growth performance, 
with Nigeria and Saudi Arabia being the most 
volatile. However, since the oil price rise starting 
in 2003, all four countries have had relatively 
stable real GDP growth at elevated levels, 
comparable to those in other emerging market 
economies.
In terms of GDP per capita, oil-exporting 
countries exhibit higher levels (Chart 2), but 
lower and less steady growth than emerging 
market economies. GDP per capita was stagnant 
or even falling in the late 1980s and 1990s, 
reﬂ   ecting a combination of low oil prices, 
high population growth (Algeria, Nigeria and 
Saudi Arabia) and economic crisis (Russia). 
This trend was reversed only at the beginning 
of this decade with high and rising oil prices. 
Russia in particular shows an accelerated and 
above average pace of GDP per capita growth, 
supported by steady population decline, unlike 
other oil exporters and emerging market 
economies.
Data for Russia before 1992 are data for the Soviet Union. 7 
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WHY HAS GROWTH PERFORMANCE BEEN DISAPPOINTING IN RESOURCE-RICH COUNTRIES  – 
A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
After the ﬁ  rst oil price shocks in the 1970s,1 economists sought a better understanding of the 
impact of growing revenue inﬂ  ows on oil exporters’ economies (Mabro and Monroe (1974), Neary 
and van Wijnbergen (1986)). Several empirical studies showed that resource-abundant countries 
tend to grow slower than countries without natural resources (Sachs and Warner (1995, 1999), 
Auty (1993, 2001)). This phenomenon became known as the “resource curse”.2
There are four main explanations of the resource curse: the Dutch disease hypothesis; reduced 
incentives to develop the non-resource part of the economy; high volatility of resource revenues; 
and political economy effects of resource income, in particular with regard to institutional quality.
(i) The traditional approach to tackling the resource curse was the Dutch disease hypothesis 
(Auty and Gelb (1986), Auty (1994), Benjamin, Devarajan and Weiner (1989)). Dutch disease is 
the combined inﬂ  uence of two effects: the appreciation of a country’s real exchange rate caused 
by the sharp rise in exports and the tendency of a booming resource sector to draw capital and 
labour away from a country’s manufacturing and agricultural sectors, raising their production 
costs. Together these effects can lead to a decline in exports of agricultural and manufactured 
goods and inﬂ  ate the cost of non-tradable goods. Subsequently, several studies (Neary and van 
Wijnbergen (1986), Fardmanesh (1991), Mikesell (1997)) found that in the period 1971-83 some 
oil exporters did not show a signiﬁ  cant shift of labour and capital away from manufacturing 
toward resource sectors, although their agricultural sectors often suffered (Benjamin, Devarajan 
and Weiner (1989)). Since then numerous studies have tried to identify alternative channels 
through which resource revenues could harm economic growth. 
(ii) One school of thought is that resource-abundance may reduce the incentives to accumulate 
skills and invest in human resources (Birdsall and Jasperson (1997), Auty (2001)) and to 
accumulate private capital (Bufﬁ   e (1993), Stevens (2003)). The concentration of resource 
revenues on the public sector (Auty (1998a) and (2003)) could also delay difﬁ  cult decisions 
on economic reforms and thus jeopardise economic development. These features tend to 
reduce investment efﬁ   ciency, cumulate economic distortions and retard diversiﬁ  cation 
(Auty and Gelb (2001)). 
(iii) Another explanation of the poor performance of resource-rich economies could come 
from the high volatility of resource revenues associated with the dynamics of, for example, oil 
prices. Several studies consider the impact of the volatility of public revenues and expenditures 
on economic growth (Lane (2003), Afonso and Furceri (2008)). In general, oil-exporting 
economies experience higher volatility in their public sector and external balances. Auty (1998b) 
and Mikesell (1997) identiﬁ  ed higher degrees of trade volatility in regions with high shares of 
1  Although not centred on oil-exporting economies, previous studies have examined the economic impact of resource windfalls. 
Stevens (2003) includes historical references from as far back as the 14th century.
2  More recently these results have been challenged. Van der Ploeg and Arezki (2008) show that much of the empirical evidence for a 
negative effect of natural resource dependence on growth performance does not survive after extending the sample period and allowing 
for the endogeneity of explanatory variables. Simultaneously they are able to show the negative impact controlling for endogeneity in 
countries with low degree of openness to trade.12
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CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCES
Current account balances of oil exporters exhibit 
a higher volatility than those of emerging market 
economies due to oil price movements, and in 
times of high oil prices show high surpluses 
(Chart 3). The latter has been particularly 
pronounced since the beginning of this decade. 
While emerging markets on average have had 
gradually rising current account surpluses 
since 2000, reﬂ   ecting developments in Asia 
in particular, oil exporters’ surpluses initially 
surged and then remained at high levels. 
Country-speciﬁ   c developments are notable. 
Nigeria’s and Saudi Arabia’s current accounts are 
subject to particularly strong ﬂ  uctuations, with 
primary exports. This could be the source of increasing investor uncertainty and could impede 
the implementation of a balanced ﬁ  scal policy, thus retarding economic growth. 
Auty (2001) also links the larger volatility of revenue incomes to the inability of governments 
to properly manage public surpluses, implying for example a tendency to conduct pro-cyclical 
ﬁ  scal policies and an unproductive use of funds. Haussmann and Ribogon (2002) take this 
research further and link the “curse” to the impact of demand volatility on incentives for the 
risk-averse investor. Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2007) show that the positive effects of 
resources on growth can be swamped by the indirect negative effects arising from income 
volatility, and that this effect is larger in landlocked countries with ethnic tensions.3
(iv) This last result points to another school of thought, which emphasises the political economy 
effects of resource abundance as an explanation of the “resource curse”. Natural resource 
rents can be a source of conﬂ  ict, political instability, corruption, weak institutions, inequitable 
distribution of wealth and policy failure, especially in the case of factional political states that are 
associated with heterogeneous societies (Easterly and Levine (1997), Karl (1997)). Governments 
may prefer non-transparent methods of deploying the rents in order to maximise the scope for 
political manoeuvring, while interest groups, such as foreign investors or state ofﬁ  cials, ﬁ  ght 
to retain oil revenues and create barriers to change (Carneiro (2007)). Favoured channels for 
deploying rents are trade protection, job creation in the public sector and over-extended public 
expenditure. Market discipline may be eroded and governments in resource-abundant countries 
are under less pressure to align their interests with the majority (Auty and Gelb (2001)). The 
empirical literature has addressed two aspects of this issue: the impact of resource rents on the 
quality of institutions and the impact of institutional quality on income. 
Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) and Van der Ploeg and Arezki (2008) are able to identify a 
signiﬁ  cant negative indirect effect of natural resources on the quality of institutions. The ﬁ  rst study 
uses the “rule of law” and several alternative related indexes as a measure of institutional quality. 
Van der Ploeg and Arezki (2008) allow for interaction effects and provide evidence that the natural 
resource curse is particularly severe for economic performance in countries with a low degree of 
trade openness. They also argue that bad trade policies are highly correlated with bad ﬁ  scal policies. 
The impact of institutional quality on economic growth in resource-exporting economies is shown 
in Mehlum, Moene and Torvik (2006) and Boschini, Pettersson and Roine (2007). Natural resources 
push aggregate income down when institutions are prone to unproductive inﬂ  uence activities 
(“grabber friendly”), while more resources raise income when institutions are “producer friendly”.
3  As natural resources are mainly exported by sea, landlocked countries usually have higher shipping costs (Iimi (2006)).13
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sometimes large deﬁ  cits in the 1980s and 1990s. 
This is explained by their particularly high 
dependency on oil exports, which since 1980 
have averaged well above 80% of total exports 
of goods and services (compared to an average 
of 56% for the top ten oil exporters). Russia’s 
current account balance is less volatile, reﬂ  ecting 
the fact that since 1980 oil exports have averaged 
only 34% of total exports. Recently this value 
has been much higher, at well above 40%, and 
the lower average value since 1980 is due partly 
to low oil prices in the 1990s and partly to the 
slump in oil production following the collapse 
of the Soviet Union. Algeria’s current account 
is also more volatile than in emerging market 
economies in general (but somewhat less than 
in other oil exporters). In the mid-1990s the 
civil war in Algeria also had a noticeable impact 
as the current account displayed deﬁ  cits  in 
several years. 
Over the past few years, current account 
surpluses have been particularly high in Middle 
Eastern and North African oil exporters like 
Saudi Arabia and Algeria, while Russia’s surplus 
has been much lower and declining over the past 
two years. While import growth is buoyant in all 
oil-exporting countries, albeit masked in some 
cases by even faster growing revenues and thus 
high current account surpluses, Russia’s import 
growth has been particularly strong due to strong 
economic activity and possibly also owing to a 
somewhat more ﬂ   exible exchange rate policy 
than, for example, in Saudi Arabia that allowed 
for a limited appreciation of the Russian rouble 
(see sub-section 3.2.2).
INFLATION
Over the longer term oil-exporting countries 
have had a signiﬁ  cantly better record on inﬂ  ation 
than emerging market economies in general 
(Chart 4). Their inﬂ  ation was much lower during 
the 1980s, when many emerging market 
economies faced high inﬂ   ation rates, and – 
if one excludes the speciﬁ  c case of Russia 8 – 
Russia suffered extremely high inﬂ   ation in the early 1990s  8 
which, given Russia’s relatively high weight in the average 
ﬁ  gure, would distort the overall picture of inﬂ  ation developments 
in oil-exporting countries.
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were also lower during the 1990s. Russia, like 
other transition economies, saw a burst of 
inﬂ   ation at the beginning of the transition 
process after the liberalisation of prices and 
again after the ﬁ   nancial crisis of 1998, since 
when it has seen protracted disinﬂ  ation. Nigeria 
is another oil exporter with high and volatile 
inﬂ  ation. This contrasts with low and relatively 
stable inﬂ  ation in Saudi Arabia (and other oil 
exporters on the Arabian Peninsula).
The relatively stable inﬂ   ation performance of 
oil exporters over the long run, compared to 
emerging markets in general, may be explained 
by the lower degree of ﬁ   scal dominance of 
monetary policy – frequently a root cause of 
high inﬂ   ation in emerging and developing 
economies. Given the signiﬁ  cantly higher level 
of public revenue as a result of income from oil 
(see Chart 7 in sub-section 2), oil exporters can 
ﬁ   nance higher public expenditure without 
incurring budget deﬁ   cits. Moreover, as many 
oil-exporting countries have accumulated 
ﬁ   nancial assets on which they can draw to 
temporarily  ﬁ   nance budget deﬁ  cits,  the 
inclination to resort to monetary ﬁ  nancing of 
budget deﬁ  cits is lower.9 Another factor that has 
contributed to relatively low inﬂ   ation in a
long-term perspective, is exchange rate regimes. 
Most oil-exporting countries – in particular in 
the Gulf region – have pegs or tightly managed 
ﬂ  oats to the US dollar, and have thus “imported” 
monetary discipline and credibility. 
Since the beginning of the current decade, 
however, average inﬂ  ation of oil exporters has 
exceeded the average for emerging market 
and developing countries, reﬂ  ecting improved 
inﬂ  ation performance among the latter and, in 
the wake of high oil prices, mounting inﬂ  ationary 
pressure in all major oil-exporting countries – 
including the four under consideration here. As 
a result of the exchange rate regimes, monetary 
conditions have been relatively loose and 
monetary policy has been constrained in curbing 
inﬂ  ationary pressure, placing a particular burden 
on  ﬁ   scal policy to maintain macroeconomic 
stability (see sub-section 3.2 for a more detailed 
discussion of recent policy challenges).
2.2 FISCAL  PERFORMANCE
GENERAL GOVERNMENT BALANCE-TO-GDP RATIO
The general government balance-to-GDP ratio 
of the four countries under review has been 
highly volatile and has improved dramatically 
since the turn of the century. Oil prices have 
been the key driver of their ﬁ  scal performance
(Chart 5). While emerging and developing 
countries have also seen an improvement of 
their  ﬁ   scal balances over the last decade, oil 
exporters have outperformed them, exhibiting – 
sometimes large – surpluses, thanks to rising 
oil prices. However, some events not related 
to oil prices have had an impact on long-
term budget performance. The collapse of the 
Soviet Union in the early 1990s was followed 
by a long period of transition, during which 
ﬁ   scal performance was poor. Thus, Russia’s 
general government balance-to-GDP ratio 
A particularly striking example is Kuwait, which following the  9 
Iraqi invasion in 1990 could reﬁ   nance the re-construction of 
the country by drawing on its reserve fund. Public debt, which 
had spiked to 200% of GDP in 1991, was reduced rapidly 
(to 35% of GDP only ten years later, in 2001).
























Notes: Averages weighted by GDP in PPP terms. 2008: projections. 
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was deeply and steadily negative until 1999. 
More surprisingly, Algeria’s public ﬁ  nances 
were not as affected as might have been expected 
in the period of civil war (1992-99).10 Nigeria’s 
ﬁ  scal performance has been highly volatile, also 
due to the political environment. For instance, 
a dramatic deterioration was observed in 1998 
when Nigeria’s ruler was overthrown. In 
recent years too, Nigeria’s budget performance 
has remained more volatile than in other
oil-exporting countries. This is largely due to 
the conﬂ   icts in some oil-rich regions (Niger 
Delta), which disrupt oil production. In Saudi 
Arabia, the ﬁ  scal outcome has closely mirrored 
the average of oil exporters, although since the 
turn of the century the budget surplus has been 
much higher than the average. 
PUBLIC DEBT-TO-GDP RATIO
The average gross public debt-to-GDP ratio of 
major oil-exporting countries reached almost 
80% in the late 1990s. This increase reﬂ  ected, 
among other things, difﬁ   culties in reining in 
relatively high expenditure when oil prices fell 
after earlier oil price booms, in particular in the 
1990s. Since the beginning of this decade, 
however, public debt has plummeted in the 
wake of rising oil prices (Chart 6). Oil exporters 
used windfall revenues to signiﬁ  cantly  and 
rapidly reduce their – in some cases very high – 
public debt, and ﬁ   scal vulnerabilities have 
receded. Public indebtedness peaked in the late 
1990s, except in Algeria where the decline 
started in the mid-1990s from a very high level 
(120% of GDP). In the late 1990s Russia was 
also highly indebted (around 100% of GDP in 
1999) following the ﬁ  nancial crisis of 1998. The 
increase in oil prices in recent years enabled 
Russia to sign an agreement with the Paris Club 
on the early repayment of all its external debt of 
USD 22 billion.11 In Nigeria the decline in public 
debt was not mainly the result of high oil 
revenues but of a debt rescheduling.12 Owing to 
its oil wealth, Nigeria was not included in the 
list of highly indebted poor countries (HIPCs) 
eligible for 100% debt relief from ofﬁ  cial 
lenders, the IMF and the World Bank, but 
Nigeria’s public debt was rescheduled by the 
Paris Club in 2005 with a 60% write-off, 
reducing public debt abruptly from USD 30 
billion to USD 12 billion. 
GOVERNMENT REVENUE
General government revenue (as a share of 
GDP) of oil-exporting countries is higher and 
more cyclical than in emerging and developing 
countries due to the importance and volatility 
of oil revenues (Chart 7). Government revenues 
increased from around 30% of GDP on average 
at the end-1990s to above 40% recently in 
the wake of rising oil prices, despite the 
concomitant sharp rise in nominal GDP, which 
raised the denominator of the revenue-to-GDP 
ratio. Among oil-exporting countries, Nigeria 
distinguishes itself by having the highest 
ﬂ   uctuations, while Russia and Algeria mirror 
This may be explained by the fact that the civil unrest and  10 
terrorist activities took place mainly in the northern part of the 
country where the bulk of the population is located, which is far 
from the Saharan desert where oil is extracted (e.g. the city of 
Hassi Messaoud).
This operation represented the largest repayment ever made  11 
to the Paris Club creditors. Under the previous rescheduling 
agreements of 1996 and 1999, debt to the Paris Club creditors 
was to be repaid between 2006 and 2020.
The opacity of ﬁ   scal data for Nigeria before 2003 makes  12 
an assessment of public debt difﬁ   cult. Fiscal analysis was 
complicated by a multiplicity of off-budget funds. Therefore the 
public debt data for Nigeria indicated in Chart 6 start from 2003.
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the average for oil exporters. The sharp and 
steady increase in oil prices in recent years until 
mid-2008 did not have a noticeable impact on 
Nigeria’s public revenues as a percentage of 
GDP, in part due to production problems and 
unrest in the Niger Delta region. Relatively 
strong economic growth in 2002 also drove the 
revenue-to-GDP ratio down. By contrast, in 
Saudi Arabia general government revenue as a 
share of GDP has increased sharply since 2002, 
and has remained well above the average for oil 
exporters. This is due in part to oil production 
increases. Saudi Arabia is the country with by 
far the largest spare capacity and, unlike other 
oil exporters, could therefore signiﬁ  cantly 
raise production when prices were rising, thus 
beneﬁ   ting both from higher oil prices and 
increased production. It is also due in part to 
somewhat more moderate economic growth 
compared to other oil exporters, so the increase 
in the denominator of the revenue-to-GDP ratio 
was less pronounced. 
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE
General government expenditure has stood at 
above 30% of GDP since the turn of the century, 
which is somewhat higher than in emerging and 
developing countries on average (Chart 8). Thus 
the increase in oil prices in recent years until 
mid-2008 did not translate into a noticeable 
increase in public expenditure as a share 
of GDP, notwithstanding signiﬁ  cant  ﬁ  scal 
expansion (see sub-section 3.2.1). This is due to 
the substantial nominal GDP increases in recent 
years. The higher average expenditure level
in the early 1990s was driven by the collapse 
of the former Soviet Union, followed by a 
deeply negative real GDP growth rate in Russia
(-15% in 1992, see Chart 1), which sharply 
increased expenditure as a share of GDP. The high 
volatility of Nigeria’s expenditure-to-GDP ratio 
reﬂ  ects sharp ﬂ  uctuations in output and revenue
(see above).
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3  KEY FISCAL POLICY CHALLENGES STEMMING 
FROM HYDROCARBON DEPENDENCE
Sub-section 1 of this section brieﬂ  y  reviews 
the  ﬁ   scal challenges that are common to 
hydrocarbon-dependent (and in fact all 
commodity-centred) economies, irrespective of 
the level and direction of movement of prices. 
Sub-section 2 discusses in more detail the policy 
issues that have emerged in the wake of high 
and rising oil prices since the beginning of the 
decade until mid-2008, and brieﬂ  y touches on 
the change of perspective in view of the sharp 
turnaround in oil prices since then.
3.1 GENERAL  CHALLENGES
Fiscal policy in oil-exporting countries faces 
speciﬁ  c challenges related to the fact that oil 
revenues are exhaustible, volatile, uncertain 
and largely originate from abroad.13 The 
challenges tend to be greater the larger the 
share of oil revenues is in the government’s 
overall revenues and the larger the oil sector is 
in the economy. The speciﬁ  c features of oil 
revenues pose challenges in both the long and 
the short term – intergenerational equity and 
ﬁ   scal sustainability in the long term, and 
macroeconomic management and ﬁ  scal 
planning in the short term. 
3.1.1 LONG-TERM ISSUES: INTERGENERATIONAL 
EQUITY AND FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY
In the long term the challenge stems from the 
exhaustibility of oil reserves and concerns the 
issues of ﬁ  scal sustainability and intergenerational 
resource allocation.14 The principal policy 
options to address these challenges are to save 
oil revenues in order to accumulate ﬁ  nancial 
assets or to invest in physical assets (i.e. use 
them for capital expenditure). To avoid a sharp 
adjustment of ﬁ  scal policy once oil reserves are 
exhausted, and to secure national wealth  15 for 
future generations, one option for oil-exporting 
countries is to accumulate ﬁ  nancial assets during 
the periods in which they produce oil. After the 
end of oil production, the revenues from these 
assets can be used to replace oil income and to 
maintain levels of expenditure. Oil wealth is 
thus gradually transformed into ﬁ  nancial wealth, 
leaving the country’s overall wealth unchanged 
and preserving it for future generations. Charts 9 
and 10 illustrate – based on this reasoning and 
using highly simpliﬁ  ed assumptions – how the 
stock of national wealth is preserved for future 
generations and how the sustainability of ﬁ  scal 
revenues is maintained. 
See Barnett and Ossowski (2002). The following considerations  13 
are mainly based on their comprehensive overview and analysis 
of operational aspects of ﬁ  scal policy in oil-exporting countries. 
See also Medas and Zakharova (2009), who further develop the 
topic.
Fiscal sustainability is achieved if in the “post-oil age” the same  14 
amount of public goods (level of expenditure) can be provided 
as in the “oil age” without resorting to deﬁ  cit  ﬁ  nancing  of 
public expenditure. Intergenerational equity requires citizens in 
the “post-oil age” to enjoy the same amount of public goods as 
the generation in the “oil age” without bearing a higher ﬁ  scal 
burden (e.g. in the form of taxation). This implies that achieving 
intergenerational equity is more demanding than ensuring ﬁ  scal 
sustainability. If oil revenues are replaced by tax revenues, 
this would ensure ﬁ   scal sustainability but not necessarily 
intergenerational equity.
It is assumed that oil and gas are publicly owned and revenues  15 
from their extraction accrue to the government, which is the case 
in most oil-exporting countries.
Chart 9 Preserving national wealth through 
financial asset accumulation
Year
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Assumptions: Ten years oil production, constant production of ten 
barrels p.a., constant price of USD 10 per barrel, i.e. constant oil 
revenue of USD 100 p.a.18
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Intuitively, this reasoning is straightforward and 
makes a strong case for persistent overall ﬁ  scal 
surpluses to accumulate ﬁ  nancial  assets.16 
However, deriving concrete policy conclusions 
from theory, making them operational and, even 
more so, implementing them is challenging. For 
example, estimating the oil wealth of a country, 
deﬁ  ned as the present discounted value of future 
oil revenues, is surrounded by signiﬁ  cant 
uncertainty regarding the underlying 
assumptions. There is uncertainty about the 
future path of oil prices, about oil reserves, and 
about the costs of extracting them. For example, 
in the long run, an extreme case to be considered 
could be technical innovations largely replacing 
oil as a primary energy source, or signiﬁ  cantly 
enhancing efﬁ  ciency in the use of oil, which 
would greatly reduce the value of oil reserves or 
even make them obsolete. Given such 
uncertainties, prudence in the design of ﬁ  scal 
policies is deemed important, in particular from 
the point of view of long-term considerations.17
In principle, capital expenditure and the 
accumulation of physical assets could represent 
an alternative to the accumulation of ﬁ  nancial 
assets in preserving national wealth for future 
generations and ensuring ﬁ  scal  sustainability. 
This would reduce the need for persistent ﬁ  scal 
surpluses and thus allow more expansionary 
policies. In particular, investment in physical 
infrastructure and in social infrastructure, 
e.g. education and health, is generally seen as 
beneﬁ  cial in this regard, as such expenditure can 
be conducive to diversifying the economy away 
from hydrocarbons, developing the private 
non-oil sector and thus also creating a basis for 
generating tax revenues.18 The question of 
whether to save oil revenues and accumulate 
ﬁ  nancial assets or to spend them on productive 
investment boils down to the respective rates of 
return on the alternative uses and on their 
relative volatility.19 While the rates of return on 
(usually foreign) ﬁ  nancial assets depend on the 
type of investment and conditions in global 
ﬁ  nancial markets, rates of return on (domestic) 
capital expenditure are much harder to identify, 
more uncertain and tend to depend on various 
country-speciﬁ  c factors.20 Among other factors, 
such as the stock and quality of existing public 
capital and thus the marginal return on additional 
investment, governance and, in particular, levels 
See Alier and Kaufman (1999), who, based on an extension of  16 
the non-stochastic overlapping generation model, make the case 
for persistent ﬁ  scal surpluses in an economy with non-renewable 
resources on intergenerational equity grounds.
See, for instance, Bjerkholt (2003), who suggests a conservative  17 
approach to ﬁ   scal policy (the “bird-in-the-hand” rule) to 
counter the uncertainty of a country’s oil wealth by limiting 
non-oil deﬁ  cits to the return on accumulated assets. Chart 10 
illustrates this approach. Norway’s ﬁ   scal rule comes closest 
to implementing it in an oil-exporting country (see Section 4). 
A somewhat less conservative approach is the so-called 
permanent consumption rule (see Balassone, Takizawa and 
Zebregs (2006)). According to this approach, the optimal 
non-oil deﬁ  cit is equal to the return on the present discounted 
value of oil wealth (which is less than the annual ﬂ  ow  of 
oil revenues, i.e. also in this case ﬁ  nancial assets need to be 
accumulated). The “bird-in-the-hand” rule has the advantage 
that it does not require estimates of oil wealth. The permanent 
consumption rule has the advantage that it allows for some 
“frontloading” of public expenditure, which may be more 
appropriate for countries with large development needs, e.g. in 
infrastructure.
For attempts, progress and rationale for economic diversiﬁ  cation  18 
in GCC economies, see Sturm et al (2008).
If oil revenues were spent on productive investment rather  19 
than saved, in Chart 10 revenues from ﬁ  nancial assets could be 
replaced by tax (or other public) revenues.
Empirical studies ﬁ  nd that the marginal product of public capital  20 
can be much higher than that of private capital, roughly equal to 
that of private capital, well below that of private capital or in some 
cases even negative. See Romp and de Haan (2007) for a recent 
review of the literature on public capital and economic growth.
Chart 10 Maintaining fiscal revenue 
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Assumptions: The same as in Chart 9; in addition, a return   of 
10% p.a. on ﬁ  nancial assets is assumed.19
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of corruption have been identiﬁ   ed as factors 
determining the productivity of public 
investment and its impact on economic growth.21 
Indeed, analysis of the effects of public capital 
expenditure on non-oil real GDP growth and 
private investment in the four countries under 
closer consideration in this paper suggests that 
the impact varies from country to country and 
that public investment may not always yield the 
desired positive effects (Box 2).
See for example Haque and Kneller (2007) and Tanzi and  21 
Davoodi (1997), who provide empirical evidence that corruption 
increases public investment but reduces its productivity and 
effect on economic growth.
Box 2
THE IMPACT OF A SHOCK TO PUBLIC INVESTMENT IN SELECTED OIL-EXPORTING COUNTRIES
A number of recent studies have investigated the relationship between public investment 
and productivity and growth using vector autoregressive (VAR) models.1 A great number of 
studies have applied VAR modelling to estimate the impact of public investment in developed 
economies.2 However, research for developing countries is more limited, possibly due to the lack 
of sufﬁ  ciently long time series.3 
Based on data from the IMF World Economic Outlook database for the period 1980-2008, 
a three-variable VAR model is constructed and estimated for the four countries under closer 
consideration in this paper: Algeria, Nigeria, Russia and Saudi Arabia. The variables in the 
VAR are the logarithmic growth rates of real public investment, real private investment and real 
non-oil GDP.4 
The p-th vector autoregressive model in standard form can be written as:
p
i=1
Xt = c + ∑ Ai Xt-i + εt 
where Xt = [Δlog pubIt, ΔlogprivIt, ΔlognoGDPt] is the (3x1) set of variables, Ai is a matrix (3x3) 
of autoregressive coefﬁ  cients, c is a vector (3x1) of intercepts and the vector εt (3x1) represents 
the residuals following a white noise process. The lag length of the model is selected according 
to the usual information criteria.5
The equations in the VAR model can be estimated separately by using OLS. The OLS estimates 
are, under general conditions, consistent and asymptotically normally distributed. If all variables 
are stationary, the estimated impulse responses will also be consistent. The variables used in this 
1  This methodology replaces the traditional production function approach, being more ﬂ  exible with respect to the possible relations and 
interactions between the variables.
2  Kamps (2005), Pina and St Aubyn (2005), Afonso and St Aubyn (2008), Pereira (2000).
3  Jayaraman (1998) for Fiji; Valadkhani (2004) for Iran. See Belloc and Vertova (2004) for a good literature review on the crowding-out 
hypothesis in developing countries.
4  Many of the studies used as a reference also include other variables, e.g. inﬂ  ation rate in Valadkhani (2004), taxes and real exchange 
rate in Afonso and St Aubyn (2008), and population in Kamps (2005). The estimation here is limited to these three variables on 
several grounds. First, the relations estimated by these previous studies between other variables and GDP growth are often found to 
be insigniﬁ  cant. Second, these three variables are the only set of variables common to the majority of the consulted studies. Third, the 
small number of observations available for the four countries constrains analysis.
5  The maximum number of lags has been restricted to three, and, according to the criteria consulted, not more than two lags are included 
in any of the cases.20
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box may easily be assumed to be stationary since they are constructed from logarithmic growth 
rates of series in levels.6 
Chart A below shows the responses of private investment and non-oil GDP to a one unit shock 
to public investment in period one, and the response of non-oil GDP to an equivalent impulse to 
private investment.7 
6  One could raise the possibility of the variables in levels being non-stationary and cointegrated. Unfortunately, with the limited number 
of observations, the results of the cointegration test cannot be reliable. See, for example, Hjalmarsson and Österholm (2007) for an 
evaluation of the performance of the cointegration tests. Instead, it is assumed that there is no economic reason to believe in a long-run 
relationship between the variables, as most of the related literature has traditionally done. See, for example, Pereira (2000), Pereira and 
Roca Sagales (2001), Voss (2002) and Afonso and St Aubyn (2008).
7  In order to compute the responses, the Choleski decomposition of the matrix of covariances of the residuals is imposed. The selected 
order of variables assumes that public investment growth has a contemporaneous effect on private investment and non-oil GDP growth 
rates while these two variables only have a lagged impact on public investment growth. Similarly, private investment growth may 
induce a contemporaneous effect on non-oil GDP growth while the impact of a shock to non-oil GDP growth on private investment 
growth will start one period after the shock.
Chart A Responses to impulses on public and private investment
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Two main conclusions can be drawn from this analysis. (i) A strong positive effect 
of a shock to public investment on private investment and non-oil GDP growth is 
observable in none of the countries. This tends to support caution in suggesting that 
physical and ﬁ   nancial assets are substitutes and that public investment can yield similar 
results as saving oil proceeds. (ii) The pattern of behaviour differs across countries. 
While in Saudi Arabia some positive impact of increased public investment on private 
investment and non-oil GDP growth is noticeable over time, Russia, in particular,  seems 
to be a case where public investment has a potential to crowd out private investment. 
A 1 percentage point rise in public investment growth would induce an immediate decrease in 
the growth rate of private investment of around 0.3 percentage points. Moreover, in Russia – 
more than in the other oil exporters examined here – private investment, unlike public 
investment, has a positive impact on non-oil GDP growth. The results for Algeria and Nigeria 
are somewhere between Russia and Saudi Arabia.
Chart A Responses to impulses on public and private investment (continued)
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A possible explanation for public investment not having an unequivocally positive impact on 
private investment and non-oil GDP growth may be levels of governance and, in particular, 
corruption prevailing in the countries under consideration, which may impede the usually 
expected positive effects of public capital outlays from being achieved.8 All four countries 
have relatively low governance levels, well 
below OECD levels (and far below Norway, 
which is the oil-exporting country with the 
highest level of governance and can thus 
serve as a benchmark, Chart B). Among the 
four countries under consideration, Saudi 
Arabia has the best performance in terms of 
governance, while Nigeria has the poorest, 
while Algeria shows some improvement 
from low levels over the past decade. This 
evidence is broadly supported by Transparency 
International’s corruption perception index, 
both in terms of an overall low performance 
of the four countries under consideration and 
in terms of the relative positions of the four to 
each other (see the Table above). This analysis 
points to a possible dilemma of ﬁ  scal policy 
in less developed oil-exporting countries with 
regard to public investment. Countries with 
a high need for public capital outlays given 
their relatively low stock of public investment, 
which would imply a high return on such 
investment in principle, also have relatively 
low governance levels, which tends to reduce 
the return on public investment in practice. 
8  See main text above and the literature quoted there.






























Notes: Indicators for 2006. Arithmetic unweighted OECD 
average. The six governance indicators are measured in units 
ranging from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to 
better governance outcomes.
Perceived corruption in selected oil-exporting countries
Saudi Arabia Algeria Russia Nigeria
Corruption Perception Index score 3.4 3.0 2.3 2.2
Country rank 79 99 143 147
Source: Transparency International.
Notes: Data for 2007. 180 countries have been examined. The score relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business 
people and country analysts and ranges from 10 (“highly clean”) to 0 (“highly corrupt”).
Memorandum: Norway: score 8.7, country rank 9.23
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To sum up, the uncertainties surrounding the 
effects of public capital expenditure on 
productivity, future output and government 
revenues, and the difﬁ  culties in distinguishing 
between capital expenditure and current 
expenditure,22 warrant some caution in how far 
capital expenditure can be a substitute for the 
accumulation of ﬁ   nancial assets in achieving 
intergenerational equity and ﬁ  nancial 
sustainability in oil-exporting countries.23 
The two alternative policy options brieﬂ  y 
outlined here – accumulating ﬁ  nancial  assets 
and capital expenditure – assume that oil is 
produced and revenues are received, so only 
their use has to be decided. A possible third 
option to preserve or maximise national wealth 
is to keep oil in the ground and produce at a 
later stage. This option appears attractive if the 
expected return on “oil in the ground” is higher 
than both the return on ﬁ  nancial assets and on 
capital expenditure. This would in particular 
be the case if a country expects rising oil 
prices in future, while at the same time adverse 
conditions on global ﬁ  nancial markets dampens 
returns on ﬁ  nancial investment and returns on 
capital expenditure are low, e.g. due to low 
governance levels or administrative capacity.24 
The respective returns on the use of oil revenues 
constitute the opportunity costs of leaving oil in 
the ground. The major risk involved in pursuing 
this option is that the future value of oil in the 
ground is uncertain and may be reduced by, 
for example, technological progress which 
enhances energy efﬁ  ciency and the development 
of alternative energy sources, making future oil 
demand and thus prices lower than expected. If 
such a scenario materialised, “frontloading” oil 
production would have been the better option.
3.1.2 SHORT-TERM ISSUES: MACROECONOMIC 
MANAGEMENT AND FISCAL PLANNING
The short-term challenge for ﬁ   scal policy in 
oil-exporting countries stems from the volatility 
and unpredictability of oil prices, which was 
particularly evident in 2008 with large swings 
in oil prices (from USD 99 per barrel in January 
to a peak of USD 147 in July and down to 
USD 34 in December). This means that public 
ﬁ   nances are dependent on a volatile variable 
that is largely beyond the authorities’ control. 
This poses a challenge to both macroeconomic 
management and ﬁ  scal planning. The volatility 
of oil prices, and hence government revenues, 
tends to contribute to a pro-cyclical pattern of 
government expenditure, and to abrupt changes 
in government spending, which may translate 
into macroeconomic volatility and reduced 
growth prospects. Indeed, pro-cyclicality has 
been a feature of ﬁ  scal policy in oil-exporting 
countries, as evidenced by the empirical analysis 
in Box 3. This makes a case for smoothing 
public expenditure, which is further supported 
by the other potential ﬁ   scal costs of volatile 
expenditure policies. For example, during a 
period of rapidly rising expenditure, these 
costs may include a reduction in the quality 
and efﬁ   ciency of spending due to constraints 
on administrative capacity or the realisation 
of projects with little marginal value added 
and difﬁ  culties in containing and streamlining 
expenditure following an expansion. In periods 
of rapidly declining expenditure, moreover, 
viable investment projects may be interrupted. 
Following normal budget conventions, e.g. the salary of a teacher  22 
is current/consumptive expenditure, while construction costs for a 
public swimming pool are capital expenditure. However, it might 
be reasonable to think that expenditure on the former has a more 
beneﬁ  cial effect on future economic growth and public revenues 
than the latter (“investing in brains instead of concrete”). Current 
expenditure in the education (and possibly also the health) sector 
could therefore be akin to capital expenditure in the narrow 
sense, contributing to the accumulation of human capital and 
thus future economic growth. Sachs (2007), for example, sees 
human capital as another long-lasting asset that oil exporters can 
invest in, alongside ﬁ  nancial and physical assets (or leaving oil 
in the ground, see next paragraph).
Instead of classifying capital expenditure as productive  23 
spending, whose effect on future revenues is indeed highly 
uncertain and may therefore not theoretically underpin its deﬁ  cit 
ﬁ  nancing, capital expenditure may also be regarded as more akin 
to spending on durable consumption. According to this view, 
governments undertake capital spending not because capital 
is productive, but because government capital provides social 
beneﬁ  ts for many years. Barnett and Ossowski (2002) suggest 
that this view of capital spending may provide a rationale for 
higher non-oil deﬁ   cits. Conceptually, while this view would 
be compatible with intergenerational equity considerations 
(as also future generations enjoy the social beneﬁ  ts), spending oil 
revenues on “durable consumption” would not necessarily ensure 
ﬁ  scal sustainability (as no future tax revenue is generated).
See Stevens and Mitchell (2008) on this option in the context of  24 
oil-exporting countries’ depletion policies. 24
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In general, targeting a particular level of overall 
budget balance is rendered difﬁ  cult by oil price 
volatility. Moreover, the overall budget balance-
to-GDP ratio has to be interpreted with even 
greater caution in oil-exporting countries than in 
industrialised economies,25 and cannot be 
considered a reliable indicator of the course of 
ﬁ  scal policy. In a period of rising oil prices, for 
example, the deﬁ  cit (surplus)-to-GDP ratio may 
decline (rise) in spite of expansionary ﬁ  scal 
policies featuring expenditure increases or a 
reduction in non-oil revenue. Higher oil revenues 
(and higher oil GDP) would mask the ﬁ  scal 
expansion. Conversely, in a period of falling oil 
prices the deﬁ   cit (surplus)-to-GDP ratio may 
rise (fall) in spite of budgetary consolidation in 
the form of expenditure reductions and an 
increase in non-oil revenue. An assessment of 
the underlying ﬁ  scal policy stance on the basis 
of the overall balance could therefore be 
misleading. For this reason, other indicators are 
needed to guide ﬁ  scal policy and to assess the 
underlying  ﬁ   scal stance, such as the non-oil 
balance/non-oil GDP ratio, an indicator which 
isolates the budget balance from oil price 
developments.26 Non-oil balances cannot replace 
conventional  ﬁ   scal indicators, like overall or 
primary balances, but they complement the 
analysis of ﬁ   scal developments in oil-centred 
economies.
In advanced economies, structural budget balances are computed  25 
to assess the ﬁ  scal stance corrected for the cyclical impact on 
the government’s budget revenue and expenditure side. In many 
oil-exporting countries, tax systems and unemployment insurance 
schemes are underdeveloped or do not exist so far. Therefore 
automatic stabilisers do not at present play a signiﬁ  cant role 
in oil-exporting countries, and computing a structural balance 
would provide limited insight (and in most cases not be possible 
due to data constraints).
See Medas and Zakharova (2009). See also Sturm and Siegfried  26 
(2005) on ﬁ   scal indicators in oil-exporting countries in the 
context of ﬁ  scal convergence criteria for the GCC countries.
Box 3
PRO-CYCLICAL FISCAL POLICIES IN OIL-EXPORTING COUNTRIES
This box provides empirical analysis on the pro-cyclicality of ﬁ  scal policy in oil-exporting 
countries. A panel of 19 oil-exporting countries for which data is available for the period 
1965-2005 has been selected.1 The sample is split into two sub-periods, 1965-1984 and 
1985-2005, the ﬁ  rst covering the ﬁ  rst two oil price shocks and the second covering the beginnings 
of the recent oil price hike.
The pro-cyclicality of ﬁ  scal policy is estimated by taking public consumption as the variable 
that represents changes in ﬁ  scal policy.2 Cyclical ﬂ  uctuations (output gaps) are modelled by 
comparing actual production data with the Hodrick-Prescott smoothed series.3 A panel data 
1  Algeria, Angola, Bahrain, Republic of Congo, Ecuador, Gabon, Indonesia, Iran, Kuwait, Libya, Mexico, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, 
Saudi Arabia, Syria, Trinidad and Tobago, United Arab Emirates and Venezuela. The data source is the World Development Indicators 
provided by the World Bank.
2  The pro-cyclicality of ﬁ  scal policy in developing economies has been object of numerous studies. See for example Riascos and 
Vegh (2003) and Ilzetzki and Vegh (2008). There is an interesting discussion on the appropriate ﬁ  scal variables to capture the cyclical 
behaviour of ﬁ  scal policy in Ilzetzki and Vegh (2008). Many studies use the ﬁ  scal balance as the indicator of ﬁ  scal policy, but because 
of the high dependence of this variable on revenues from resource exports, it does not appear to be the right variable to be analysed in 
the case of oil-exporting countries. Public consumption is used here, owing to data availability. It might perhaps be more appropriate 
to analyse the cyclical behaviour of total public expenditure, thus also capturing the role of public investment. However, no data are 
available for total public expenditure for the period 1965-1984. The model has also been estimated for the second sub-period using the 
total public expenditure growth rate (deﬂ  ated using the GDP deﬂ  ator) as the dependent variable. This, however, does not change the 
broad picture. The estimated coefﬁ  cients attached to the output gap are quite similar, although slightly larger, to those shown here for 
public consumption growth.
3  Although this is a methodology widely accepted in the literature, there is some debate about the appropriate measure of the gap. As 
shown in Scott (2000), the different alternatives to measure the gap will not normally lead to signiﬁ  cant divergences.25
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model is then constructed and estimated which includes the reaction of the growth rate of public 
consumption to alterations in the output gap. 
Among the great number of studies consulted, there are a few that only include ﬁ  scal variables in 
the panel (Manasse, 2006). In this analysis trade openness is included in the form of growth rates 
over GDP, as this variable is present in the majority of studies about the pro-cyclicality of ﬁ  scal 
policy (Lane (2003), Alberola and Montero (2006), Woo (2008)).4 
Three different estimation methods are used in the table below. The ﬁ  rst column represents a 
linear model estimated using ﬁ  xed effects. The second column describes the estimation of the 
ﬁ  xed effects model in the presence of an autocorrelated (AR) error term. The presence of serial 
correlation in the error term might be induced by the omission of dynamics in the static model. 
A dynamic version of the model estimated through a version of the Generalised Method of 
Moments (GMM), which includes one lag of the dependent variable to control for this possibility, 
is presented in the third column.5
The results point to pro-cyclical behaviour of ﬁ  scal policy over the whole period 1965-2005, 
which seems to have been even more pronounced in the second sub-period. The estimated 
coefﬁ  cients are not only larger, but their levels of statistical signiﬁ  cance are also stronger. Thus, 
the analysis conﬁ  rms that pro-cyclical conduct of ﬁ  scal policy – frequently identiﬁ  ed in the 
literature as a problem in oil-exporting countries – is indeed a feature over a relatively long 
period of time, with no signs of abating. 
4  There are also a great variety of control variables representing other determinants of pro-cyclicality, such as economic structure 
(Lane (2003), Woo (2008)), political institutions (Alesina and Tabellini (2005), Turrini (2008)) and level and dispersion of education 
(Woo (2008)). Because of the lack of consensus and weak signiﬁ  cance of control variables in previous studies, they are not included in 
the model. As a robustness check, the model has been estimated with a more extended set of control variables often used in the related 
literature and with the output gap alone. The direction of results is not altered with this exercise. For the sake of brevity, these results 
are not shown here. In any case, all the factors that reﬂ  ect heterogeneity among countries but that are time-invariant will be included in 
the idiosyncratic term of the panel data model.
5 The  coefﬁ  cients have been estimated using the one step version of the GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). The one 
step procedure is relied upon rather than the two step, based on the ﬁ  ndings in Judson and Owen (1997), and applied to the length of the 
cross-section and time dimensions of the dataset.
Panel data estimation of pro-cyclicality of fiscal policies in oil-exporting countries 
Dependent variable: Change in public consumption
Sample: 1965-1984 Sample: 1985-2005
Linear AR D-GMM Linear AR D-GMM
P cons 0.0084 -0.1039  *
(lag) (0.057) (0.058)
ogap 0.2265  ** 0.1685 0.3664  *** 0.4072  *** 0.3929  *** 0.8467  ***
(0.112) (0.123) (0.129) (0.138) (0.149) (0.226)
Trade 0.00916  ** 0.0100  ** 0.0069 -0.0300 -0.03435 -0.0454
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.024) (0.025) (0.027)
R within 0.024 0.022 0.031 0.029
Obs 342 324 306 338 319 299
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. 
*, **, *** denote statistical signiﬁ  cance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.26
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3.2  POLICY CHALLENGES IN THE CURRENT 
DECADE
Since the beginning of this decade, and in 
particular since 2003, oil-exporting countries’ 
budget balances have been characterised by 
high surpluses (see sub-section 2.2, Chart 5). 
While this may be perceived as, and indeed is, a 
very favourable ﬁ  scal outcome for the countries 
concerned, in particular compared to sometimes 
signiﬁ   cant budget deﬁ   cits in previous years, 
this situation poses some challenges of its own. 
The key challenge has been to calibrate ﬁ  scal 
policy between competing short and long-term 
objectives and pressures, in particular cyclical 
and intergenerational equity considerations, 
domestic political pressures and international 
considerations. This challenge has been 
mitigated somewhat since mid-2008, when 
oil prices started to fall sharply and the global 
economy slowed down signiﬁ  cantly, alleviating 
inﬂ  ationary pressure in oil-exporting countries 
which had previously been the “dark cloud” in 
an otherwise very favourable macroeconomic 
environment. 
3.2.1 FISCAL POLICY AND THE REAL ECONOMY
Fiscal expansion in booming economies
Over recent years oil-exporting countries have 
enjoyed buoyant real GDP growth (see Chart 1 
in sub-section 2.1) accompanied by high 
current account and ﬁ  scal surpluses (Charts 3 
and 5). Real GDP growth has been driven by 
domestic consumption and investment, with 
public investment playing a major role. In 
addition to private consumption, which has 
been bolstered by high consumer conﬁ  dence as 
a result of high oil prices, expansionary ﬁ  scal 
policy has been a key driver of the economic 
expansion of recent years. Indeed, ﬁ  scal 
expansion is the key mechanism in most 
oil-exporting countries for “injecting” oil 
revenues into the economy (see Chart 11).27 As 
in most major oil-exporting countries upstream 
activities in the oil sector are controlled by 
state oil companies (e.g. Saudi Aramco in 
Saudi Arabia) oil revenues accrue directly and 
completely to the government. Thus, the use of 
oil revenues is a ﬁ  scal policy decision, and it is 
via public expenditure that oil revenues impact 
the domestic economy, including inﬂ  ation.28
Fiscal policy has been expansionary over past 
years, as evidenced in public expenditure 
growth and the development of non-oil deﬁ  cits. 
The ﬁ  scal expansion has been masked by high 
and rising surpluses, as increasing expenditure 
See e.g. Husain, Tazhibayeva and Ter-Martirosyan (2008). They  27 
show – based on panel VAR analysis and the associated impulse 
responses – that once ﬁ  scal policy changes are removed, oil 
price shocks do not have a signiﬁ  cant independent effect on the 
economic cycle.
In the case of Saudi Arabia, typically about 93% of Saudi  28 
Aramco’s proﬁ  ts, which has the monopoly of oil production in 
the country, are transferred to the government in the form of 
royalties and dividends which is a legacy of the company’s history 
as a private American company before being fully nationalised 
in 1980 – see Myers Jaffe and Elass (2007). Retained earnings 
are used to ﬁ   nance the company’s normal operations. While 
Saudi Aramco has a high degree of operational independence, all 
strategic decisions are taken by the Supreme Petroleum Council, 
so oil income and its use are ultimately controlled by the Saudi 
Government. Furthermore, the company is used for quasi-ﬁ  scal 
activities – see footnote 31.
Table 2 Real increases in public expenditure in selected oil-exporting countries
(percent; year-on-year)
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 *
Algeria -6.1 13.1 20.2 11.3 9.1 14.8
Nigeria 12.1 2.4 11.6 3.4 12.3 18.1
Russia 5.6 5.5 20.2 9.3 19.4 20.1
Saudi Arabia 4.5 17.0 11.3 10.3 12.0 -0.9
Oil exporters average 5.4 10.0 20.8 12.5 10.6 14.6
Sources: IMF (* projections) and ECB staff calculations. 
Notes: Average weighted by GDP in PPP terms. Figures for growth in real public expenditure are calculated by deducting annual 
CPI inﬂ  ation rates from the year-on-year growth rate for nominal general government expenditure and net lending of the IMF WEO.27
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has not kept pace with revenue growth. Public 
expenditure growth in oil-exporting countries 
has been buoyant, with double-digit increases 
in real terms in every year since 2004 (Table 2). 
As public debt has fallen sharply (see Chart 6), 
interest expenditure has come down, so it may 
be assumed, although no concise data are 
available, that primary spending has risen even 
faster. Among the four countries under 
consideration, expenditure growth was highest 
in Russia and Algeria. The spike in Russian 
spending in 2007-08 was related to 
parliamentary and presidential elections taking 
place in 2007. In 2004 Algeria launched a USD 
55 billion public investment programme, later 
augmented to USD 155 billion (120% of 2007 
GDP), focusing in particular on social housing 
and transport infrastructure. Saudi Arabia also 
recorded signiﬁ  cant ﬁ  scal expansion, centred 
on an ambitious investment programme, with 
projects worth USD 350 billion (93% of 2007 
GDP) underway or being planned, including 
Chart 11 Oil revenues, government expenditure and the economy – a stylised overview
Oil revenue State oil-company
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the establishment of up to six “economic 
cities”.29 The projected decrease in public 
expenditure in real terms in 2008 is related to a 
spike in inﬂ   ation (see sub-section 3.2.2). 
Expenditure growth was relatively moderate in 
Nigeria until 2008, pointing to the effects of a 
newly introduced oil-price based ﬁ  scal rule in 
fostering  ﬁ   scal discipline (see Section 4). 
However, the release of a portion of the 
country’s windfall oil savings to the three tiers 
of government in the course of 2008 points to 
risks to ﬁ  scal discipline. 
The development of non-oil deﬁ  cits (see above 
on this indicator) also points to the expansionary 
course of ﬁ  scal policy (Table 3). While levels 
are not directly comparable, owing to different 
deﬁ  nitions, the trend towards ﬁ  scal expansion 
is clear in all four countries. Non-oil deﬁ  cits 
rose sharply in Saudi Arabia and Algeria as a 
percentage of non-oil GDP. In Russia, for which 
no computation of non-oil GDP is available, 
the non-oil deﬁ  cit-to-GDP ratio increased from 
3.9% of GDP in 2003 to a projected 7.2% 
in 2008. In Nigeria, the non-oil primary deﬁ  cit 
as a percentage of non-oil GDP increased only 
moderately between 2004 and 2007, with a 
relatively sharp jump projected for 2008. 
Fiscal expansion via expenditure increases 
in recent years has focused on capital outlays 
(Table 4). Growth in capital expenditure 
between 2003 and 2008 exceeded increases in 
current expenditure (and thus total expenditure). 
As a result, the share of capital expenditure in 
The establishment of six economic cities is a key element of Saudi  29 
Arabia’s investment programme. Each economic city is intended to 
focus on speciﬁ  c economic activities and industries. The economic 
cities are seen as key to fostering diversiﬁ  cation and re-balancing 
growth between the country’s regions. Unlike in the smaller Gulf 
oil-exporting countries regional disparities are an issue in Saudi 
Arabia. The cities are primarily to be established in regions which 
have not beneﬁ   ted from the buoyant activity in recent years. 
To realise its ambitious investment programme, Saudi Arabia, like 
other oil-exporting countries, increasingly utilises public-private 
partnerships (PPPs) in areas that traditionally were domains of 
public investment. While PPPs can increase efﬁ  ciency, e.g. in 
procurement and by resorting to private sector innovation and 
management skills, they also involve risks. They may, for example, 
give rise to contingent liabilities and reduce ﬁ  scal transparency, 
unless governed by strong institutional frameworks.
Table 3 Trends in non-oil deficits in selected oil-exporting countries
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 *
Algeria  1) -27.9 -30.1 -34.7 -36.0 -36.9 -39.5
Nigeria  2)  - -24.0 -27.0 -29.0 -28.0 -32.0
Russia  3)  -3.9 -2.9 -5.1 -4.5 -5.5 -7.2
Saudi Arabia  1) -46.7 -45.8 -50.9 -52.7 -59.2 -51.5
Source: IMF (* projections).
1) Central government ﬁ  scal balance as a percentage of non-oil GDP.
2) Consolidated government non-oil primary balance as a percentage of non-oil GDP.
3) General government non-oil balance as a percentage of GDP, excluding one-off tax receipt from Yukos.
Table 4 Capital expenditure in selected oil-exporting countries
Capital expenditure Memorandum:






Real total expenditure 
increase 2003-2008
2003 2008 2003 2008 (%) (%)
Algeria 37.1 40.5 10.9 11.5 104.5 87.4
Nigeria 16.6 33.3 3.1 4.4 145.5 22.6
Saudi Arabia 14.4 25.9 4.8 6.9 195.1 63.6
Russia 13.1 14.7 4.6 5.0 109.7 87.5
Sources: IMF and ECB staff calculations. 2008 data are IMF projections.
Notes: Algeria and Saudi Arabia: central government. Nigeria: total federal government and extra-budgetary expenditure. For 2008 
capital expenditure includes large-scale infrastructure projects (ﬁ  nanced by state and local government). Russia: gross public ﬁ  xed capital 
formation.29
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total expenditure and as a percentage of GDP 
increased over the past ﬁ   ve years. The most 
pronounced increase in real terms was in Saudi 
Arabia, while it was more moderate in Algeria 
and Russia. Given that these two countries 
exhibited the highest overall rise in expenditure, 
this points to dynamic increases in current 
expenditure as well. 
Indeed, current expenditure was also raised to a 
non-negligible extent in all four countries, 
although, given the even faster expansion of 
capital expenditure and fast nominal GDP 
growth its share in total expenditure and as a 
percentage of GDP declined (Table 5).30 For 
example, between 2003 and 2008 outlays on 
public wages increased by 75% in Algeria and 
expenditure on subsidies in Saudi Arabia rose 
by almost 30%.31 The degree and pattern of 
ﬁ   scal expansion is also observable in the 
elasticity of public spending with regard to 
changes in public revenues (Box 4).
Current expenditure increases appear very moderate in Nigeria.  30 
While indeed some ﬁ  scal moderation is observable in Nigeria, 
not least as a result of a ﬁ  scal rule, Table 5 may underestimate 
growth in current outlays, as only federal government and 
extra-budgetary expenditure is reported. However, as Nigeria is 
a federal state with substantive public spending at regional level, 
current expenditure is not fully captured. 
The budget ﬁ  gure for subsidies in Saudi Arabia tends to vastly  31 
underestimate the degree of subsidisation in the country. Direct 
subsidies in the budget accounted for less than 1% of GDP in 
2007. However, Saudi Aramco, the state oil company, sells 
domestic fuel at below market prices, which is an implicit subsidy 
estimated at 11.5% of GDP in 2007. This implies that the subsidy 
is prima facie borne by Saudi Aramco. However, as it reduces the 
proﬁ  t transferred by the company to the government, it ultimately 
has a ﬁ  scal cost in the form of reduced oil revenues. Similar 
indirect subsidies exist for water and electricity, for example. 
Saudi Aramco is one example of the quasi-ﬁ  scal  activities 
conducted by state oil companies in many oil-exporting countries. 
Nigeria’s NNPC also subsidises domestic fuel to redistribute oil 
proceeds to the general population. Russia’s Rosneft has been 
tapped as a tool for regional development in remote regions. See 
Baker Institute (2007). 
Table 5 Current expenditure in selected oil-exporting countries
Current expenditure Memorandum:






Real total expenditure 
increase 2003-2008
2003 2008 2003 2008 (%) (%)
Algeria 72.9 59.5 21.4 16.9 52.8 87.4
Nigeria 83.3 72.9 15.3 9.6 7.4 22.6
Saudi Arabia 85.6 74.1 28.5 19.7 41.5 63.6
Russia NA NA NA NA NA 87.5
Sources: IMF and ECB staff calculations. 2008 data are IMF projections.
Notes: Algeria and Saudi Arabia: central government. Nigeria: total federal government and extra-budgetary expenditure. Russia: general 
government.
Box 4
THE REACTION OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE TO CHANGES IN PUBLIC REVENUE IN OIL-EXPORTING 
COUNTRIES
This box presents the elasticity of public expenditure in ten major oil-exporting countries with 
respect to public revenues for the period 1998-2007 (see Table). The period is sub-divided into 
1998-2002 and 2003-2007 in order to compare, in particular, public expenditure in the wake of 
high and rising oil prices since 2003 with the previous 5 years, in which oil price movements 
were more moderate. The elasticities of total public expenditure and those of the sub-components 
public capital expenditure and public current expenditure with respect to total public revenues 
have been computed. As oil revenues account for a signiﬁ  cant share of total public revenues in 30
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major oil-exporting countries, changes in total revenues are driven, in particular, by changes in 
oil receipts, so the reaction of expenditure to changes in total revenues can be considered a good 
proxy for the reaction to changes in oil revenues.
The average elasticity is 0.77 for total expenditure over the past 10 years, slightly larger for 
capital expenditure (especially in the second sub-period) and slightly smaller for current 
expenditure (also especially in the second sub-period). This conﬁ  rms that, with the rise in oil 
prices since 2003, the main focus of expenditure increases has been capital outlays, while current 
expenditure has also increased signiﬁ  cantly.
Saudi Arabia, Algeria and Libya are the countries with the highest elasticity of capital 
expenditure to revenue changes since 2003, reﬂ  ecting the large public investment programmes 
in these countries. In Saudi Arabia the marked contrast to the period 1998-2002 is noteworthy 
(as also the case in Kuwait). 
The highest elasticities of total expenditure to revenue changes since 2003 are observable 
in Venezuela and Iran, reﬂ   ecting very expansionary ﬁ   scal policies in those countries 
(see also Chart 13). Moreover, increases in current expenditure were more pronounced than in 
other major oil exporters. In Russia, the elasticity of current expenditure since 2003 is also high 
and exceeds the elasticity of capital expenditure.
Public expenditure elasticities in oil-exporting countries
(with respect to public revenues)
Elasticity of
Period public expenditure public capital expenditure public current expenditure
Algeria 98/02 0.823 1.040 0.743
03/07 0.880 1.401 0.577
Iran 98/02 0.779 0.843 0.724
03/07 0.991 0.588 1.208
Kuwait 98/02 0.407 0.024 0.455
03/07 0.677 1.040 0.610
Libya 98/02 0.834 1.266 0.713
03/07 0.785 1.363 0.379
Nigeria 98/02 0.665 0.564 0.700
03/07 0.918 1.125 0.837
Norway 98/02 0.695 0.060 0.744
03/07 0.457 0.940 0.418
Russia 98/02 0.884 1.249 0.822
03/07 0.864 0.699 0.886
Saudi Arabia 98/02 0.649 0.438 0.677
03/07 0.675 1.558 0.360
United Arab Emirates 98/02 1.090 0.740 1.362
03/07 0.417 0.512 0.330
Venezuela 98/02 0.889 0.950 0.852
03/07 1.079 1.173 1.036
Non-weighted average 98/02 0.772 0.791 0.783
03/07 0.774 1.051 0.691
Sources: IMF WEO database and ECB staff calculations. Data for Norway: “Statistics Norway”.
Notes: Public capital expenditure is gross public ﬁ   xed capital formation. Current expenditure has been computed as the residual 
from total public expenditure and gross public ﬁ  xed capital formation. Data are for general government with the exception of Algeria (central 
government). The table shows the relative change in total public expenditure, public capital expenditure and public current expenditure 
with respect to changes in total public revenues. The formula used is the “average elasticity” computed as (Δexpenditure / Δrevenues) * 
(average revenue / average expenditure).31
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Reacting to falling oil prices and the global 
economic downturn
The intensiﬁ  cation of the global ﬁ  nancial turmoil, 
the subsequent acceleration of the economic 
downturn and the concomitant sharp fall in oil 
prices in the second half of 2008 changed within 
a few short months the set of issues faced by 
ﬁ   scal policy in oil-exporting countries in the 
short run. Since then inﬂ  ationary pressures have 
been on the decline, mitigating some of the 
conﬂ   icts between competing ﬁ  scal  objectives 
analysed below (sub-section 3.2.3) that have 
complicated the conduct of ﬁ  scal policy over the 
past few years. In the short run, the sharp and 
rapid fall in oil prices has brought to the fore the 
question of whether oil-exporting countries can 
continue with various spending programmes 
initiated over the past years, in particular in 
the area of public investment, or whether they 
need to adjust spending to dampened revenue 
prospects. In the medium term, the question is 
how they could adjust if the fall in oil prices is 
not temporary but more persistent. 
A key issue in the short run is how far oil prices 
can fall without oil-exporting countries incurring 
budget deﬁ   cits. This “ﬁ   scal break-even” oil 
price indicates at which level of oil prices 
budget balances would turn from surplus into 
deﬁ  cit at a given level of expenditure. This level 
varies from country to country, depending on, 
for example, the level of public expenditure and 
the share of oil revenues in total public revenues 
(see Table 6, which provides an overview of 
estimated ﬁ  scal break-even oil prices for 2009). 
Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern and 
North African oil exporters exhibit relatively 
low  ﬁ  scal break-even oil prices, whereas, for 
example, Russia and, in particular, Iran have 
much higher thresholds (i.e. their budgets 
are less resilient to recently lower oil prices). 
Countries that have embarked on a relatively 
strong ﬁ  scal expansion in recent years face the 
greatest risk of running deﬁ  cits in the rapidly 
changing environment. 
This does not imply that oil-exporting countries 
need to avoid deﬁ  cits and adjust ﬁ  scal policies 
instantly. Most oil exporters are in a position to 
maintain levels of spending reached in recent 
years, as they have brought down public debt to 
low levels and have accumulated – sometimes 
large – foreign assets. These can be used to 
bridge a period of temporarily low oil prices and 
to avoid pro-cyclicality of ﬁ  scal policy, which is 
a key challenge for ﬁ  scal policy in oil-exporting 
countries in view of large, unpredictable swings 
in oil prices. The stabilisation function of oil 
funds (see sub-section 4.2) has been introduced 
to address exactly such a situation and to 
prevent abrupt adjustments in expenditure and 
pro-cyclicality. 
To the extent that public spending initiated 
over the past few years has been identiﬁ  ed as 
useful (e.g., in order to diversify the economy 
or upgrade infrastructure – see sub-section 3.2.3 
on development-related spending needs), 
continuing the spending programmes would 
help to stabilise the domestic economy and 
The countries with the lowest elasticity of total expenditure to revenue changes since 2003 
are Norway and the UAE. In Norway this reﬂ  ects generally conservative ﬁ  scal policies with a 
high inclination to save oil proceeds (see also Section 4). In the UAE the private sector is more 
developed than in other Gulf oil-exporting countries, so the investment spree of the past years 
has been less driven by public expenditure than elsewhere in the region.
Table 6 Fiscal break-even oil prices 
for selected oil-exporting countries







Saudi Arabia  49
United Arab Emirates  23
Sources: IMF, Goldman Sachs (Nigeria, Russia).
Note: Estimates for 2009.32
ECB
Occasional Paper No 104
June 2009
contribute to global stabilisation efforts. At the 
same time, lower oil prices and tighter budgets 
may prompt the reconsideration of some of 
the planned investment projects and possibly 
the postponement or cancellation of marginal 
projects whose value added is not self-evident. 
The authorities in Saudi Arabia have indicated 
that they do indeed plan to go ahead with 
spending plans, as evidenced, for example, in 
the budget for 2009, which foresees a signiﬁ  cant 
increase in spending relative to the 2008 budget, 
in spite of sharply lower revenues, and, for 
the ﬁ  rst time since 2004, includes a projected 
budget deﬁ  cit. Algeria does not intend to alter 
its ﬁ  scal stance in 2009 either, and plans to go 
ahead with the implementation of the public 
investment programme. It is therefore likely 
to exhibit a budget deﬁ  cit in 2009, for the ﬁ  rst 
time since 1999, while the government develops 
ﬁ  scal contingency plans for the event that oil 
prices remain low over the medium term. In 
Russia ﬁ  scal policy is also still set to remain 
on an expansionary path, with an explicit ﬁ  scal 
stimulus package coming on top of an already 
expansionary budget for 2009, even though 
capital outﬂ   ows and reductions in foreign 
exchange reserves owing to central bank efforts 
to limit currency depreciation may eventually 
limit the scope for ﬁ  scal expansion and budget 
deﬁ  cits. 
If oil prices were to remain at relatively low 
levels compared to the past few years for a 
protracted period of time, however, oil exporters 
would inevitably have to adjust ﬁ  scal policy or 
run the risk of accumulating large public debt 
again.32 Adjustments could take place on the 
expenditure and the revenue side. On the 
expenditure side, current outlays and expenditure 
on marginal investment projects could be 
reduced without impeding longer term growth 
prospects or diversiﬁ   cation efforts. On the 
revenue side, the introduction or expansion of 
taxes could be envisaged to ensure ﬁ  scal 
sustainability. Broadening the revenue base by 
developing an efﬁ  cient tax system would in any 
case be beneﬁ   cial over the medium term by 
reducing the strong reliance on oil receipts 
(see Table 1) and enhancing the control of 
authorities over public revenues, which are still 
largely beyond their control. The almost 
complete absence of taxation is particularly 
striking in Saudi Arabia and other GCC 
countries.33 At the same time, distortions and 
disincentives to work, save and invest through 
the introduction of new taxes or the increase of 
existing taxes need to be minimised, in particular 
in order to avoid taxation becoming an 
impediment to efforts to enhance economic 
diversiﬁ  cation.
Making the necessary ﬁ   scal adjustments may 
nevertheless be difﬁ  cult, as evidenced by the 
experience of the 1980s and 1990s. Many 
oil-exporting countries ran persistent budget 
deﬁ   cits and accumulated large public debt 
(see sub-section 2.2) as they neither sufﬁ  ciently 
reined in spending that was increased during 
the 1970s nor developed alternative sources of 
revenue.
3.2.2 FISCAL POLICY AND INFLATION
Inflationary pressure in the wake of the 
economic expansion
While the overall macroeconomic backdrop 
for oil-exporting countries has been favourable 
since 2003, with high economic growth and 
large  ﬁ   scal and current account surpluses, 
rising inﬂ  ation has emerged as a “dark cloud” 
in their economic performance. As discussed in 
sub-section 2.1, in the past inﬂ  ation  in 
oil-exporting countries had generally been 
somewhat lower than in emerging market 
economies in general. However, they have seen 
rising inﬂ  ation, in particular in 2007-08, in line 
with global and emerging market developments, 
and in some oil-exporting countries the rise 
in inﬂ   ation has been particularly pronounced 
(Chart 12).
Given medium-term projections of global oil demand and  32 
supply, which suggest a tight global oil market (see for example 
IEA (2008)), a scenario of very low oil prices over a protracted 
period of time currently does not seem to be the most likely one, 
but also cannot be ruled out. 
At present GCC countries do not levy personal income taxes  33 
or general consumption taxes. The introduction of a VAT, 
co-ordinated among GCC countries, is under discussion.33
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In Russia the protracted disinﬂ  ation  process, 
which brought inﬂ   ation down to single-digit 
rates in 2006, has reversed, with inﬂ  ation almost 
doubling in one year between mid-2007 and 
mid-2008 to around 15%. Saudi Arabia, where 
average inﬂ  ation over the past decades was at 
very low levels of between 0% and 2%, has seen 
prices gradually creep up since 2005. Since 
mid-2007 inﬂ   ation has surged, with monthly 
inﬂ   ation rates (year-on-year) of above 10% 
during most of 2008. Saudi Arabia thus followed 
the trend seen earlier in smaller Gulf oil 
exporters like the UAE and Qatar. Nigeria has 
also experienced rising inﬂ  ation since mid-2007. 
Although high at around 12%, inﬂ  ation is still 
relatively moderate compared to the even higher 
(and more volatile) inﬂ  ation rates of the past 
(see Chart 4, sub-section 2.1). In Algeria 
inﬂ  ation has also been on an upward trend since 
2006, albeit at still relatively moderate levels. 
However, inﬂ  ationary pressure in Algeria and 
other oil-exporting countries may not be fully 
reﬂ  ected in headline ﬁ  gures owing to widespread 
subsidies and administered prices, in particular 
for energy and food, and deﬁ   ciencies in CPI 
baskets.34 Subsidies imply that rising oil and 
food prices do not immediately translate into 
rising headline inﬂ   ation, but are absorbed 
by the government budget. Unlike some 
non-oil-exporting emerging market and 
developing countries, which had to reduce oil 
and food subsidies in view of their rising burden 
on the budget in the wake of high and rising 
global commodity prices in past years, oil 
exporters, given their favourable ﬁ  scal position, 
can afford to maintain subsidy schemes, in spite 
of the economic distortions caused by such 
schemes. 
The rise in inﬂ   ation has been driven by a 
combination of global and domestic factors. 
Global factors include increasing commodity 
prices, in particular oil and food prices, which 
have led to a rise in inﬂ   ation worldwide. In 
recent years the weakness of the US dollar has 
been another factor contributing to inﬂ  ationary 
pressure in many oil-exporting countries 
because of their exchange rate regimes 
(see below). The key domestic factor has been 
buoyant domestic demand in the wake of high 
oil prices, accompanied in many cases by rapid 
money and credit growth. Domestic demand 
has been stimulated to a signiﬁ  cant extent by 
ﬁ   scal expansion. Indeed, some correlation is 
observable between real public expenditure 
increases in oil-exporting countries over recent 
years and inﬂ  ation rates (Chart 13). The most 
pronounced outliers from the trend, the UAE 
and Libya, can be explained by a relatively high 
degree of private sector investment in driving the 
economic expansion (UAE) and administered 
prices (Libya).
While inﬂ   ationary pressure is likely to abate 
in view of global economic and ﬁ  nancial 
developments since mid-2008, the experience 
of the past few years sheds light on the price 
dynamics in oil-exporting countries and the 
respective roles of ﬁ  scal and monetary policies. 
These lessons of the years 2003-08 may again 
become highly relevant once the global economy 
Algeria’s CPI basket was last updated in 1989 and may not  34 
reﬂ  ect current consumption patterns. The Economist Intelligence 
Unit (2008) estimates that underlying consumer price inﬂ  ation is 
probably around 10% to 12%.
Chart 12 Recent inflation developments 
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recovers and oil prices start rising, in particular 
in view of longer term supply and demand 
conditions in global oil markets.
Constraints on monetary policy in tackling 
inflation
Monetary policy has been constrained in 
tackling inﬂ   ation due to prevailing exchange 
rate regimes. With the exception of Norway, 
which has an inﬂ  ation targeting framework, all 
top ten net oil exporters have an external anchor 
of monetary policy, and most have a strong 
orientation to the US dollar, i.e. the currency in 
which oil is priced (Table 7). Among the four 
countries under closer consideration here, the 
link to the US dollar is closest in Saudi Arabia, 
with a ﬁ  xed parity unchanged since 1986, while 
Russia exhibits the most ﬂ  exibility. 
The nominal effective exchange rates (NEERs) 
of all four oil exporters under consideration 
have depreciated since 2002, i.e. depreciation 
set in at around the time when the oil-driven 
economic boom started (Chart 14). The nominal 
effective depreciation reﬂ  ects the weakness of 
the US dollar over the past years against other 
major currencies and has been one source of 
inﬂ  ationary pressure, in particular as a relatively 
high share of imports in oil-exporting countries 
originates from the EU. Russia’s NEER has 
remained relatively stable over the past few 
years in view of the rouble’s appreciation 
against the US dollar until July 2008, when 
this trend sharply reversed. Russia and, to a 
lesser extent, Nigeria have seen appreciation in 
their real effective exchange rate (REER) over 
the past years, which was driven by relatively 
high inﬂ  ation in these two countries and, in the 
case of Russia, was also supported by nominal 
appreciation against the US dollar. In Algeria 
and Saudi Arabia, also the REER depreciated.
Pegs or tightly managed ﬂ  oats to the US dollar 
have contributed to inﬂ   ationary pressure not 
only via nominal depreciation and higher import 
prices, but also by constraining central banks in 


































x-axis: real general government expenditure increases
(2003-2007 average)
y-axis: inflation (2006-2007 average)
Sources: IMF and ECB staff calculations.
Table 7 Exchange rate arrangements of oil-exporting countries
De facto exchange rate arrangement Reference currency
Algeria Managed ﬂ  oat USD
Iran Conventional  peg  1) Composite (undisclosed basket, presumably 
comprising USD, euro and yen)
Kuwait Conventional peg Composite (undisclosed basket, presumably dominated by USD)
Libya  Conventional peg  Composite (SDR)
Nigeria Conventional  peg  1) USD 
Norway Independent  ﬂ  oat   
Russia Managed  ﬂ  oat  USD/EUR
Saudi Arabia  Conventional peg  USD
United Arab Emirates  Conventional peg  USD
Venezuela Conventional  peg  2) USD
Sources: IMF, as of April 2007, update of 4th quarter 2007. Kuwait: ECB staff assessment, based on modiﬁ  cation of the exchange rate 
regime of May 2007. Reference currency: as per ECB staff assessment.
1) IMF staff assessments of the de facto arrangements have been different from the de jure arrangements in the review period.
2) The country maintains an exchange rate arrangement that involves more than one foreign exchange market. The indicated arrangement 
is the one in the major market.35
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their use of interest rates to tackle rising 
inﬂ  ation. In spite of increasing upward pressure 
on prices and buoyant economic growth, central 
bank interest rates have been raised only 
moderately (Nigeria, Russia  35) or, in the case of 
Saudi Arabia, have even been lowered 
(Chart 15). As a result, real interest rates have 
been declining or even turned negative, thereby 
contributing to rapid money and credit growth.36 
The room to manoeuvre in the area of interest 
rates depends on the degree of capital account 
liberalisation and the willingness to allow 
exchange rate ﬂ  exibility. In the context of oil 
exporters over the past few years, this means 
allowing appreciation against the US dollar. 
This explains why Saudi Arabia and other GCC 
countries, with their relatively open capital 
accounts and ﬁ   xed pegs, had to follow the 
Federal Reserve in lowering interest rates since 
September 2007, whereas Russia, for example, 
had a little more scope for monetary tightening, 
thanks to greater exchange rate ﬂ  exibility. 
To sum up, monetary conditions can be 
considered to have been relatively loose in 
the past years in most oil-exporting countries, 
including the four under consideration here. 
Economies that were enjoying buoyant growth 
and an oil revenue-driven ﬁ  scal stimulus have 
seen nominal and in some cases also real 
effective depreciation in their exchange rates 
and negative real interest rates. This has been 
the result of prevailing exchange rate regimes in 
combination with monetary policy in the anchor 
country, the United States, and the weakness of 
the US dollar against other major currencies.
As a consequence of loose monetary conditions 
and  ﬁ  scal expansion, fast growing economies 
have faced – not so surprisingly – rising 
inﬂ   ation, and in some cases, in particular in 
the GCC, sharply rising asset prices. Thus, 
in view of existing monetary and exchange 
rate frameworks, ﬁ   scal policy is the main 
In Russia interest rates have been raised more aggressively  35 
only since October 2008 to stem the depreciation pressure on 
the rouble in the aftermath of the intensiﬁ  cation of the global 
ﬁ  nancial turmoil.
Given the constraints on the independent use of interest rates to  36 
curb inﬂ  ation, several central banks tried to tighten monetary 
conditions by raising reserve requirements and stepping up 
the issuance of central bank bills to mop up liquidity. Several 
oil-exporting countries, in particular in the GCC have also 
resorted to administrative measures to contain inﬂ  ation.  For 
example, they introduced ceilings for rent increases. 
Chart 14 Nominal and real effective exchange rates of selected oil-exporting countries
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Sources: Haver Analytics (JP Morgan Broad Nominal and Real Effective Exchange Rate) and IMF (IFS).36
ECB
Occasional Paper No 104
June 2009
macroeconomic tool available to tackle inﬂ  ation. 
This would have called for ﬁ  scal restraint, rather 
than expansion.
3.2.3 COMPETING FISCAL POLICY OBJECTIVES 
AND CONSIDERATIONS
While under the prevailing monetary and 
exchange rate regimes the key burden of 
containing inﬂ   ation falls on ﬁ  scal  policy, 
authorities have been facing various pressures 
to increase public expenditure in times of (large) 
budget surpluses. It is also possible to make 
some economic arguments for expanding public 
spending in several areas. The major challenge 
has thus been to manage the large budget 
surpluses and to calibrate ﬁ  scal policy between 
conﬂ  icting short-term needs and pressures and 
competing long-term objectives. These diverse 
factors calling either for ﬁ   scal expansion or 
retrenchment are summarised in Table 8. 
In the short term the most obvious conﬂ  ict 
is between cyclical considerations (in order 
to contain inﬂ   ation), which require ﬁ  scal 
restraint, and various spending pressures. These 
pressures can be subdivided into expenditure 













































Sources: Haver Analytics and IMF (IFS).
Table 8 Fiscal policy considerations in oil-exporting countries in the wake of high oil prices
Short-term considerations   Long-term considerations
Calling for expenditure restraint –   Cyclical 
(curbing inﬂ  ationary pressure)
–   Intergenerational equity 
(accumulating ﬁ  nancial assets) 
–   Fiscal sustainability 
(accumulating ﬁ  nancial assets)
Calling for expenditure increases –   Distribution 
(sharing windfall revenues) 
–   Development 
(tackling underdevelopment) 
–   Global imbalances 
(recycling oil revenues)
–   Economic diversiﬁ  cation 
(investing in physical and social infrastructure)37
ECB
Occasional Paper No 104
June 2009




pressures stemming from primarily distribution-
related considerations, pressures stemming 
from development-related spending needs 
(both of which are domestic pressures) and 
policy recommendations in the context of the 
international debate about global imbalances 
(external pressure). 
Distribution-related considerations
In oil-exporting countries, governments ﬁ  nd it 
difﬁ   cult to resist public pressure for higher 
expenditure on various items when oil prices are 
high and rising. The public (or segments, interest 
groups, lobbies etc.) may think it only fair that 
they should beneﬁ  t from high oil revenues and 
demand their share of windfall revenues in the 
form of higher public spending. At the same 
time, in view of large budget surpluses (and 
large public assets, e.g. in SWFs), governments 
ﬁ  nd it hard to argue that additional expenditure 
cannot be afforded. In 2007-08 higher food 
prices have also contributed to social pressure to 
increase public expenditure.37 
The distribution-related mechanisms can work 
in different ways, depending on the country’s 
political system. In countries where elections 
decide political control the tendency to resort to 
pre-election budgets to win votes (the electoral 
cycle of ﬁ   scal policy) is further reinforced 
and constitutes the main channel for pressure 
to raise expenditure or lower taxes.38 A recent 
example is Russia in 2007, when parliamentary 
and presidential elections led to a signiﬁ  cant 
relaxation of the ﬁ  scal stance. 
In countries where elections do not decide 
political control, as in many oil-exporting 
countries for example in the Gulf region, it 
might be assumed, at ﬁ   rst glance, that such 
pressures are less relevant, given the absence 
of competing political parties trying to win 
electoral support through expenditure increases 
or tax cuts. However, distribution-related 
considerations work through different but 
potentially equally powerful channels.39 The 
implicit social contract tends to be based on 
limited representation in exchange for refraining 
from taxation. The latter implies not only low or 
no taxation of nationals in the narrow sense, but 
also the free or subsidised provision of public, 
merit or even private goods, such as health, 
education, housing, electricity and water. It 
also includes the expectation that nationals will 
be provided with employment in well-paid, 
secure, public-sector jobs.40 In the presence 
of large surpluses and large public assets, it is 
more difﬁ  cult to resist calls for higher subsidies, 
more public sector employment, higher public 
wages etc., given the nature of the implicit 
social contract.41 Recent examples of primarily 
distribution-driven expenditure in Gulf countries 
are widespread public sector wage increases 
(which are often granted in response to rising 
inﬂ  ation),42 lump-sum payments to nationals, or 
increases in subsidies.
Development-related spending needs 
Apart from primarily short-term distribution-
driven pressures, demands for higher public 
expenditure are also based on what can be 
considered as economically well-founded 
arguments as regards development-related 
spending needs. The underlying reasoning is that 
many oil-exporting countries have a relatively 
low level of economic, institutional and human 
development, with large deﬁ  cits in areas such 
as infrastructure, education and health. These 
are areas which are generally considered vital 
to economic development, private investment 
For instance, in Algeria money was drawn from the  37  Fonds de 
Régulation des Recettes, notably to fund subsidies for basic 
commodities (see Section 4).
The seminal contribution on the deﬁ   cit bias from a political  38 
economy point of view is that of Buchanan and Wagner (1977). 
Later literature has increasingly looked at speciﬁ  c features of 
democratic systems that are particularly conducive to unsound 
ﬁ  scal policies, such as individual election systems and the degree 
of political polarisation (see, for instance, Roubini and Sachs 
(1989), Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991), Corsetti and 
Roubini (1993) and Alesina and Perotti (1995)). For a more 
recent overview of the literature, see Schuknecht (2004).
See Eifert, Gelb and Tallroth (2002) on the political economy  39 
of  ﬁ   scal policy and economic management in oil-exporting 
countries.
For example, in Kuwait 90% of nationals are employed in the  40 
public sector.
As regards public assets, one reason why SWFs in the Gulf region  41 
are reluctant to provide information about the total amount of 
assets under management, is that authorities fear that publishing 
the (presumably very large) ﬁ  gures would reinforce pressure to 
spend out of the wealth accumulated in these funds.
See Sturm et al (2008) on wage developments in the GCC. 42 38
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and, in particular, economic diversiﬁ  cation.43 
The development gap is illustrated by, for 
example, human development indicators. Most 
oil-exporting countries rank lower in terms of 
human development indicators (HDIs) than 
in terms of their GDP per capita (Chart 16). 
Looking at selected countries and indicators 
(Chart 17), Saudi Arabia lags behind its peer 
group of high income economies in terms of 
HDIs, and even lags behind the middle income 
country average in terms of education, pointing 
to challenges in this area which Saudi Arabia 
shares with other Gulf and Arab oil exporters, 
including Algeria. In Russia education levels 
are relatively high, but life expectancy is very 
low, pointing to challenges in the area of health. 
Nigeria lags behind its peer group of low income 
countries in all HDIs except education.
The recent period of high oil prices and 
revenues provided oil-exporting countries with 
the  ﬁ   nancial means to narrow the gap with 
advanced economies in terms of, for example, 
physical and social infrastructure and to address 
the needs of a growing population. While, in 
principle, an economic case can be made for 
higher expenditure in these areas, in practice it 
might be difﬁ   cult to disentangle such 
expenditure from primarily distribution-related 
considerations.44
Global imbalances and oil revenue recycling 
Finally, in addition to the above mentioned 
domestic pressures for increased public 
spending, the international community has 
also called upon oil-exporting countries for 
expenditure increases in the context of the 
debate on global imbalances. For example, in 
September 2006 the International Monetary 
and Financial Committee (IMFC) called for 
“increased spending consistent with absorptive 
capacity and macroeconomic stability in oil 
producing countries”, and in April 2006 the 
annex on global imbalances to the G7 statement 
See, for example, Stevens and Mitchell (2008). 43 
For example, calls for higher salaries for teachers may be well  44 
justiﬁ  ed to increase the quality of education, which is a major 
problem in, for example, Gulf countries, but also have a distribution 
component. Similarly, building a road may be part of meaningful 
infrastructure development, but may also simply be a means to 
satisfy political demands from a local community, village etc. 
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Source: UNDP Human Development Report 2007/2008. Data 
are for 2005.
Note: Points below the 45˚-line imply that the HDI rank is lower 
than the GDP per capita rank and vice versa.
Chart 17 Human development indicators 



































Source: UNDP Human Development Report 2007/2008. Data 
are for 2005.39
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included a reference to accelerated investment 
in capacity, increased economic diversiﬁ  cation 
and enhanced exchange rate ﬂ  exibility in some 
cases in oil-producing countries. Consequently, 
Saudi Arabia as the world’s largest oil 
exporter participated in the IMF’s multilateral 
consultations on global imbalances, and in the 
staff report of June 2007 on the multilateral 
consultations the part on Saudi Arabia’s policy 
progress and plans relevant to the IMFC strategy 
focuses on public expenditure policies. 
The increased focus on oil-exporting countries 
in the debate on global imbalance has been 
motivated and justiﬁ  ed by the fact that, in the 
wake of rising oil prices since 2003, current 
account surpluses of oil exporters have become 
a major counterpart of the US current account 
deﬁ  cit, alongside East Asia’s surpluses. In the 
context of global imbalances, it is reasonable to 
assume that increased public spending by oil 
exporters will raise their imports and thus 
reduce or at least contain any further increase in 
current account surpluses, given that public 
expenditure increases tend to be correlated with 
growth in real imports, which has generally 
been strong over the past years (Chart 18). 
While the direct impact of oil-exporting 
countries’ imports on addressing global 
imbalances might be limited, owing to the 
geographical structure of trade,45 their import 
growth nevertheless constitutes oil revenue 
recycling via the trade channel, which helps to 
alleviate the adverse economic impact of higher 
oil prices in oil-importing countries.46 
Reconciling the objectives of increasing 
spending and maintaining macroeconomic 
stability, however, has become much more 
challenging over recent years in view of 
inﬂ  ation developments and the macroeconomic 
environment in oil-exporting countries. The 
potential conﬂ   ict is explicitly acknowledged 
in the IMFC strategy’s statement that 
increased spending should be consistent with 
macroeconomic stability.
With regard to long-run considerations 
for  ﬁ   scal policy, a potential conﬂ  ict  exists 
between the objective of intergenerational 
equity and ﬁ  scal sustainability and the aim of 
diversifying the economy. While the former 
calls for the accumulation of ﬁ  nancial  assets 
(see sub-section 3.1), the latter requires public 
investment in, for example, physical and 
social infrastructure.47 Putting a high weight 
on ensuring intergenerational equity and 
long-term  ﬁ   scal sustainability is consistent 
with short-run cyclical considerations when 
inﬂ   ationary pressure is high, i.e. consistent 
with ﬁ  scal restraint, the saving of oil revenues 
and the accumulation of ﬁ  nancial assets, which 
would also help to curb inﬂ  ationary pressure. 
Creating favourable conditions for long-term 
economic diversiﬁ  cation via public investment 
is consistent with more expansionary ﬁ  scal 
While import growth in oil-exporting countries has indeed been  45 
very dynamic, the direct effect on the US current account deﬁ  cit 
is limited, as the bulk of their imports come from the EU and 
Asia. 
See the box “Oil-bill recycling and its impact on extra-euro area  46 
exports” in ECB Monthly Bulletin, July 2008.
Looked at in a different way, economic diversiﬁ  cation can be  47 
interpreted as diversiﬁ  cation of production; i.e. oil production 
is to be complemented and gradually replaced by non-oil 
production and thus revenues (i.e. tax revenues resulting from 
non-oil production). By contrast, accumulating ﬁ  nancial assets 
leads only to a diversiﬁ  cation of revenues; i.e. oil revenues are 
complemented and gradually replaced by ﬁ  nancial  revenues, 
without generating non-oil production. While from a purely ﬁ  scal 
point of view the two options appear to be broadly equivalent, 
the wider economic implications are quite different, in particular 
with regard to creating employment opportunities. 
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policies and the accommodation of some of 
the expenditure pressures mentioned above. 
Addressing development-related spending needs 
is a variation on the same theme. 
3.2.4 OPTIONS TO MITIGATE CONFLICTS BETWEEN 
COMPETING FISCAL OBJECTIVES
Global economic and ﬁ  nancial  developments 
since mid-2008 have somewhat alleviated the 
conﬂ  icts between the competing ﬁ  scal objectives 
discussed above, as inﬂ   ationary pressure is 
set to diminish, including in oil-exporting 
countries. Therefore, cyclical considerations in 
particular no longer call for ﬁ  scal restraint to the 
extent they did before (see sub-section 3.2.2). 
Nevertheless, the experience of the past few 
years provides some important policy lessons 
and points to ways to mitigate possible conﬂ  icts 
should they intensify again.
Assuming that monetary policy is not given a 
greater role in curbing inﬂ  ationary  pressure, 
i.e. that existing exchange rate regimes are 
maintained, two ways of mitigating the conﬂ  icts 
between the different ﬁ  scal objectives outlined 
above stand out: improving the structure and 
optimising the phasing of public spending.
Improving the structure of public spending
Improving the structure of public spending 
requires the focusing of expenditure increases 
on investment, while at the same time containing 
consumptive expenditure. Moreover, capital 
expenditure needs to be concentrated in those 
areas that represent bottlenecks in the economy 
and thus contribute to inﬂ  ationary  pressure. 
An example is the housing sector in Saudi 
Arabia and other GCC countries. Inﬂ  ation in the 
region has been driven to a large extent by rent 
increases for housing, but also for commercial 
property. This reﬂ  ects housing shortages as a 
result of population growth, which is due to high 
birth rates, a high number of young families, 
immigration of foreign labour and the opening 
of the real estate sector to foreigners in some 
countries. Accordingly, investment in housing 
projects, in particular for low-income earners, 
has the potential to alleviate inﬂ  ationary pressure 
over the medium term.48 Another example is 
investment in oil production capacity, which 
would help to dampen upward pressure on oil 
prices and thus be conducive to containing 
global inﬂ  ation pressures in the medium term, 
once the global economy recovers from the 
current downturn.
Furthermore, there is scope to contain 
consumptive expenditure. Although the bulk of 
expenditure increases over the past few years 
have focused on investment, and the share of 
capital expenditure in total expenditure has 
increased at the expense of current expenditure 
in most countries (see Tables 4 and 5 in 
sub-section 3.2.1), current expenditure has also 
risen signiﬁ   cantly. Thus, containing public 
wages and cutting subsidies would offer room 
to increase capital expenditure without unduly 
raising total expenditure. In other words, 
focusing on development-related spending 
needs as described above would help to calibrate 
ﬁ  scal policy in a way that is more conducive to 
macroeconomic stability.
Optimising the phasing of public spending
Optimising the phasing of public spending 
entails giving priority to public spending 
(in particular investment) that helps to alleviate 
bottlenecks in the economy and increases 
its absorptive capacity (see above) and 
postponing other less urgent public investment 
to periods with lower inﬂ  ationary  pressure. 
Although the timing of public investment tends 
to be difﬁ  cult  to  ﬁ   ne-tune, recent economic 
developments provide a good example. 
In 2007-08 public investment might have 
added to rising inﬂ   ationary pressure, but it 
may be much less problematic from a cyclical 
point of view in 2009-10 in the wake of the 
global economic downturn, lower oil prices 
and receding inﬂ   ationary pressure, and may 
even be a welcome contribution to stabilising 
the domestic and global economy (see also 
sub-section 3.2.1). 
Smoothing public expenditure may also help 
central bank liquidity operations. Erratic 
See also Khan (2008). 48 41
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expenditure on, for example, investment projects 
may lead to sharp liquidity ﬂ  uctuations in the 
banking system (which in the past has been 
characterised in general by excess liquidity in 
oil-exporting countries), making it more difﬁ  cult 
for central banks to mop up excess liquidity 
(through, for example, reserve requirements or 
the issuance of certiﬁ  cates of deposits). 
Tightening monetary policy
Domestic monetary tightening would also help 
to alleviate conﬂ  icts between competing ﬁ  scal 
objectives. As mentioned above, monetary 
tightening at times when inﬂ  ationary pressure 
is on the rise would require the modiﬁ  cation 
of existing exchange rate regimes and policies. 
If monetary policy were given a greater role in 
containing inﬂ  ationary  pressure,  ﬁ  scal  policy 
would be freed from the burden of being the 
main macroeconomic tool for this. Monetary 
tightening would lead to a re-balancing of the 
macroeconomic policy mix, and enable higher 
ﬁ   scal spending without quasi-automatically 
contributing to inﬂ  ationary pressure. Thereby, a 
tighter monetary policy would help to reconcile 
competing ﬁ  scal policy objectives. For example, 
it would help oil-exporting countries to lower 
inﬂ  ation and thus achieve a domestic objective 
without a signiﬁ  cant ﬁ  scal retrenchment, which 
would reduce their contribution to addressing 
global imbalances and the recycling of oil 
revenues via the trade channel. 42
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4 INSTITUTIONAL  RESPONSES
This section reviews the most common 
institutional practices of oil-exporting countries 
in response to the general and recent policy 
challenges analysed above. These institutional 
responses are (i) setting up budgets on the basis 
of conservative oil price assumptions, 
(ii) establishing oil stabilisation and savings 
funds (OSSFs) 49 and (iii) introducing implicit or 
explicit ﬁ  scal rules. A box provides additional 
information on two resource-rich countries, 
Norway and Botswana, often regarded as 
success stories due to, among other things, 
carefully designed institutions. 
4.1  CONSERVATIVE OIL PRICE ASSUMPTIONS
IN THE BUDGET
The budgets of many oil-exporting countries are 
based on very conservative oil price assumptions 
that could be regarded as unrealistically low, in 
particular between 2004 and 2008. Although 
budgeted oil prices have tended to be adjusted 
upwards over recent years in view of the oil price 
boom, the adjustment has lagged signiﬁ  cantly 
behind actual price development. For example, 
in Algeria the reference oil price in the 2008 
budget was increased to USD 37 per barrel 
(up from USD 19 per barrel). This practice 
of basing budgets on conservative oil price 
assumptions has both merits and drawbacks. 
On one hand, it is a sign of ﬁ  scal  prudence 
and is often motivated by political economy 
considerations. Budgeting for relatively low 
revenues helps contain expenditure, as the 
draft budget displays only small surpluses or 
even deﬁ  cits. If higher revenues based on more 
realistic oil price assumptions were used and 
the initial budget showed large surpluses, it 
would be more difﬁ  cult for the authorities to 
resist various pressures to increase expenditure. 
On the other hand, basing the budget on 
conservative oil price assumptions reduces 
ﬁ  scal transparency and increases the leeway for 
the executive to spend. For example, in Saudi 
Arabia 50 (Table 9), actual expenditure over the 
past years has exceeded budgeted expenditure by 
15-20%. Thus, the budget as published, and the 
expenditure foreseen therein, tend to be different 
to the actual outcome. The government has full 
discretion over the use of the additional revenue 
received in the course of the year. Among the 
four countries under closer consideration in 
this paper, Russia had the least conservative oil 
price assumption in 2008, closest to the actual 
market price, which was initially even raised for 
2009 (to USD 95 per barrel), contrary to other 
countries and the downward trend in oil prices 
since mid-2008, but later was revised sharply 
downwards (to USD 41 per barrel) (Table 10). 
4.2  OIL STABILISATION AND SAVINGS FUNDS
Most oil-exporting countries have set up oil 
stabilisation and/or savings funds which manage 
part of the country’s foreign assets and usually 
invest them more aggressively than central 
banks invest traditional foreign exchange 
Oil stabilisation and savings funds are often also referred to as  49 
sovereign wealth funds (SWFs). Indeed, OSSFs usually qualify 
as SWFs, and the oldest SWFs are OSSFs, e.g. Kuwait’s. 
However, not all SWFs are OSSFs, as SWFs have also been 
established by non-commodity exporters, such as China and 
Singapore, to manage foreign assets.
Unlike many other oil-exporting countries Saudi Arabia does not  50 
publish an explicit oil price assumption underlying the budget, 
but the budgeted oil revenue. Assuming a level of oil production, 
private sector observers estimate an implicit assumption, on 
which the budget is based.







Revenue 400  622  55
Expenditure 380 443  17
Surplus 20  179  793
Source: Jadwa Investment.43
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4   INSTITUTIONAL 
RESPONSES reserves. Apart from this investment return 
motive,51 the establishment of these funds is 
mainly driven by ﬁ  scal policy considerations. 
The stabilisation function of oil funds addresses 
the short-term challenges of ﬁ  scal policy and 
aims to make the conduct of policy less volatile 
and less pro-cyclical by de-linking public 
spending from oil prices. When oil prices are 
high, the funds may also help contain inﬂ  ation 
and avoid over-heating in the economy. When 
oil prices are low, they provide a buffer for 
“rainy days”, as governments can draw on the 
fund and thus prevent sharp and potentially 
disruptive adjustments in expenditure. The 
savings function of oil funds addresses the long-
term challenges of intergenerational equity and 
ﬁ   scal sustainability that accompany non-
renewable resources. The revenue from 
accumulated ﬁ  nancial assets can replace income 
from oil once those resources are exhausted. 
The funds can also be drawn upon for capital 
spending where there is a high return (e.g. for 
economic diversiﬁ   cation) and can be used to 
pay down external debt.
However, oil funds pose a number of challenges 
of their own, including with regard to 
governance, transparency and accountability, 
and are not a panacea for the ﬁ  scal challenges 
of oil-exporting countries.52 They are not a 
substitute for explicit ﬁ  scal policy decisions or 
ﬁ  scal rules (see below) and political commitment 
both to smoothing expenditure and to ensuring 
long-term  ﬁ   scal sustainability. Furthermore, 
their contribution to sound ﬁ  scal  policies 
depends on the general quality of institutions 
and public ﬁ  nancial management. In countries 
where oil funds seem to have enhanced ﬁ  scal 
prudence, the effect might simply be ascribed 
to self-selection effects. Nevertheless, there is 
some evidence that oil funds are conducive to 
reducing macroeconomic volatility.53 This may 
be attributed to the fact that OSSFs tend to be 
used as a tool for neutralising the monetary 
impact of oil-related capital inﬂ   ows (i.e. for 
keeping oil revenues outside the domestic 
banking sector).
Turning to the four countries under review, 
the oil fund of Nigeria, the Excess Crude 
Oil account, established in 2004, is solely a 
stabilisation fund. The main rationale behind 
the Excess Crude Oil account is to close budget 
deﬁ  cits due to oil price volatility, and potentially 
to fund domestic infrastructure investments, as 
the infrastructure gap is a major impediment 
to growth in Nigeria. Oil revenues in excess 
of the budgeted oil price and production level 
are transferred into the Excess Crude Oil 
account, which is held at the central bank in 
the names of the various government entities, 
as Nigeria is a federal state (see below on the 
ﬁ  scal rule). Nigeria’s Excess Crude Oil account 
has increased from USD 5.1 billion in 2004 to 
USD 17.3 billion in 2007. The ﬁ  rst withdrawal 
at the federal level was used for payment of 
external debt (October 2005). 
The oil fund of Algeria, the Fonds de Régulation 
des Recettes, was established in 2000 in order to 
(i) restore the cushion of external reserves that 
had previously declined, (ii) service the stock 
of public debt, and (iii) smooth the longer-term 
proﬁ  le of expenditure. The rationale behind the 
Fonds de Régulation des Recettes, a sub-account 
of the government at the central bank in dinars, 
is to act as a stabilisation fund; it does not have 
an explicit intergenerational transfer purpose. 
Since 2004 the resources have been split between 
a small “liquid” part and a large portfolio of 
ﬁ  xed-income securities. Returns on reserves are 
ultimately transferred to the budget in the form 
of central bank dividends.54 The operational 
features of the fund leave considerable room for 
discretion. The assets are used to fund domestic 
infrastructure investments, given the large need 
for infrastructure, including social housing, and 
See Beck and Fidora (2008) on sovereign wealth funds from an  51 
investment and global ﬁ  nancial market perspective.
See Fasano (2000) and Davis, Ossowski, Daniel and Barnett  52 
(2001) for a review of the international experience with OSSFs.
Based on a panel data set of 15 oil-exporting countries, empirical  53 
estimates of Shabsigh and Ilahi (2007) indicate a robust negative 
relationship between the presence of an oil fund on one hand and 
domestic inﬂ  ation, the volatility of prices and the volatility of 
broad money on the other.
IMF (2008). 54 44
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to  ﬁ  nance subsidies for basic commodities to 
protect consumers from higher world prices. 
Revenue earned from oil prices above the 
assumed level is deposited in the fund. Algeria’s 
Fonds de Régulation des Recettes is estimated 
to have reached around USD 50 billion at the 
end of 2007.
The oil fund of Russia, the Oil Stabilisation 
Fund, was established in  2004 following the 
adoption of the Budget Code of the Russian 
Federation in December 2003. It is a cross 
between a stabilisation and a savings fund with 
the objective of ﬁ   nancing the federal budget 
deﬁ  cit if the oil price falls below the reference 
price.55 In addition to the unspent ﬁ  scal surplus 
of the previous year, the ﬁ   nancing of the 
stabilisation fund held at the central bank comes 
from two sources: oil export duties (in excess of 
a reference price) and the mineral extraction tax. 
The legislation stipulates that when the oil 
stabilisation fund reaches RUR 500 billion, the 
revenues accumulated can be drawn upon to 
repay external debt, as was the case in 2005 to 
repay loans to the IMF and to the Paris Club and 
in 2006 again to the Paris Club. In addition, the 
government also used the fund to cover the 
Pension Fund deﬁ  cit arising as a result of the 
2005 cut in the Uniﬁ   ed Social Tax.56 In 
February 2008 the oil stabilisation fund was 
split between a Reserve Fund – USD 137 billion 
at end-2008 – with a stabilisation function 
(budget deﬁ  cits are ﬁ  nanced out of assets from 
the Reserve Fund and through borrowing, 
subject to a maximum limit) and a Future 
Generation Fund – USD 88 billion at end-2008 – 
with a savings function (also called the National 
Welfare Fund) to which the portion of income 
exceeding the Reserve Fund’s upper limit is 
transferred.57 When the Reserve Fund reaches 
10% of GDP, the additional funds are transferred 
to the Future Generation Fund. 
Saudi Arabia does not have an explicit oil 
stabilisation or savings fund, unlike other 
GCC oil-exporting countries.58 Foreign assets 
are mainly accumulated by the Saudi Arabian 
Monetary Agency (SAMA), Saudi Arabia’s 
central bank. The bulk of these assets are 
not formally classiﬁ   ed as foreign exchange 
reserves, as reported, for example, to the IMF. 
Foreign exchange reserves in the narrow sense, 
reported on SAMA’s balance sheet as “Foreign 
Currencies and Gold” amount to around 
USD 32 billion (September 2008) and have 
risen only moderately over recent years (from 
around USD 20 billion in 2002). By contrast, 
foreign assets classiﬁ   ed as “Investment in 
Foreign Securities” and as “Deposits with Banks 
Abroad” amount to USD 405 billion (up from 
USD 22 billion in 2002).59 Investment in foreign 
securities are assumed to be allocated somewhat 
less conservatively than foreign exchange 
reserves in the narrow sense, without following 
the more aggressive investment patterns of 
SWFs, however. In 2008 a small sovereign 
wealth fund (the Saudi Arabian Investment 
Co., with a capital of USD 5.3 billion) was 
established under the management of the Public 
Investment Fund (PIF). Until now the fund has 
had a domestic focus, providing loans to and 
holding stakes in Saudi companies.60 
4.3 FISCAL  RULES
The widespread experience with the “deﬁ  cit 
bias” and excessive government spending driven 
by political economy factors in both 
industrialised and emerging market economies 
has drawn attention to ﬁ  scal rules as a possible 
remedy. Fiscal rules can be quantitative, 
Beck and Fidora (2008). 55 
Gianella (2007). 56 
Lainela (2007). According to Russia’s Minister of Finance, the  57 
National Welfare Fund will be invested in foreign securities after 
the global ﬁ  nancial turmoil settles down.
E.g. Kuwait’s fund, created in 1953, is the oldest and Abu  58 
Dhabi’s fund, created in 1976, is believed to be the largest in 
the world.
Saudi Arabia’s foreign assets have not increased to the extent  59 
that could be expected, given the size of the country’s oil 
revenues, as large parts were used to reduce the previously 
high public debt (see sub-section 2.2). The main counterpart of 
SAMA’s foreign assets on the balance sheet are “Deposits of the 
central government and government agencies and institutions”, 
which have also increased signiﬁ  cantly since 2003. Furthermore, 
SAMA also holds foreign assets of “independent organisations”, 
mainly the two major pension funds, which in September 2008 
accounted for USD 67 billion.
The PIF is under the auspices of the Ministry of Finance. Some  60 
foreign assets are also held at SAMA by the social security 
institutions, which currently generate large surpluses owing to 
Saudi Arabia’s demography.45
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RESPONSES i.e. provide numerical benchmarks for one or 
more key parameters of ﬁ  scal policy with the 
aim of limiting political discretion, or procedural, 
i.e. aim at improving budgetary institutions and 
management. Fiscal rules – like oil funds – are 
not a panacea to address ﬁ  scal challenges and 
involve problems of their own, including 
appropriately balancing simplicity and 
transparency on one hand against ﬂ  exibility and 
room for discretion on the other, ensuring 
effective enforcement and avoiding incentives 
for “creative accounting”. Nevertheless, it is 
increasingly acknowledged that carefully 
designed  ﬁ   scal rules can constitute a helpful 
device to foster ﬁ   scal discipline. Given the 
volatility of oil revenues and the tendency 
towards pro-cyclical ﬁ   scal policies in 
oil-exporting countries (see Box 3), ﬁ  scal rules 
could be particularly useful for guiding ﬁ  scal 
policy in oil-exporting countries, while at the 
same time the choice of an appropriate numerical 
indicator is challenging, given the impact of oil 
price ﬂ  uctuations on the budget.61
There are so far only few oil-exporting countries 
that have introduced explicit ﬁ   scal rules that 
target non-oil deﬁ   cits, as suggested by the 
literature (see sub-section 3.1), most notably 
Norway (see Box 5), while some countries 
have implicit, rudimentary rules that appear 
less binding, often based on budgeted oil prices, 
that determine transfers to an oil fund. In recent 
years Nigeria has moved to a more sophisticated 
framework.
In  Nigeria, since 2004, all three tiers of 
government have been operating in accordance 
with an oil-price-based ﬁ  scal rule, supported by 
a medium-term ﬁ  scal strategy (MTFS), which 
includes targets for the non-oil primary deﬁ  cit. 
The key provision is that oil revenues above 
the budgeted level of prices and production are 
transferred to the Excess Crude Oil account. 
The constitution provides that all tiers of 
government – federal, state and local – share 
oil revenues. Oil producing states receive 13% 
upfront and of the remaining 87% the federal 
government receives 52.7%, the states 26.7%, 
and local government 20.6%. When the Fiscal 
Responsibility Act is passed into law by the 
36 states it will institutionalise the so far voluntary 
use of the oil-price-based ﬁ  scal  rule.62 The 
ﬁ  scal rule has been instrumental in containing 
spending at levels more conducive to 
macroeconomic stability in recent years and 
was central to the turnaround in Nigeria’s 
economic performance. The rule is designed to 
link government spending with the long-term 
oil price,63 thereby de-coupling government 
spending from current oil revenues. This reduces 
the volatility of public expenditure and leads to 
the saving of part of the oil windfall receipts.64 
Algeria’s  ﬁ   scal policy is guided by a rule 
under which oil and gas revenues exceeding 
the budgeted level based on a conservative 
oil price assumption are transferred to the oil 
fund (see above). Since 2000, the state budget 
has consistently been based on a low oil price 
(USD 19 per barrel). However, based on the 
average for the previous 10 years the government 
has decided to increase the reference price in 
the 2008 mid-year supplementary budget from 
USD 19 per barrel to USD 37 per barrel. The 
upward revision of the oil price is still likely 
to leave the government with a large apparent 
budget deﬁ  cit and a de facto substantial ﬁ  scal 
surplus in 2008. 
See sub-section 3.1 and Sturm and Siegfried (2005). It has  61 
to be noted that most of the literature on ﬁ  scal rules and their 
usefulness for containing the “deﬁ  cit bias” concerns countries 
with democratic political systems. Much less is known about 
the political economy with regard to public deﬁ  cits in political 
systems where elections are not the ultimate source of political 
power and legitimacy. This is a topic that deserves further 
research. For example, enforcement of ﬁ  scal rules may prove to 
be particularly challenging in such an environment. 
Most of the provisions are legally binding only on the federal  62 
government, while encouraging states to adhere to the same 
framework. In September 2007 a political agreement was reached 
under which all states are to adopt ﬁ  scal responsibility legislation 
(IMF, 2008), which would make the use of oil revenues received 
under the oil-price-based rule less discretionary and facilitate 
ﬁ  scal coordination.
The reference price for oil in the budget appears conservative  63 
even if it has increased (2004: USD 25 per barrel; 2005: USD 30 
per barrel; 2006: USD 35 per barrel, 2007: USD 40 per barrel, 
2008: USD 59 per barrel).
Budina  64  et al (2007).46
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Russian ﬁ  scal policy is also guided by a rule 
under which oil and gas revenues exceeding the 
budgeted level, based on an oil price assumption 
which has become less conservative over the 
past few years, are transferred to the oil fund. 
Given, in particular, the large expenditure 
increases of recent years, especially in the 
context of the elections of 2007 (see 
sub-section 3.2.1), the apparently limited 
impact of public investment in enhancing 
non-oil GDP growth (see Box 2) and the upward 
trend in inﬂ  ation since mid-2007, and in view 
of Russia’s federal structure, an explicit ﬁ  scal 
rule could be conducive to ﬁ  scal discipline and 
macroeconomic stability and, for example, 
restrain mounting pressure to draw on the oil 
fund. Starting in the 2008 budget, Russia 
introduced a three-year budget regime with the 
aim of assuring consistency of ﬁ  scal policy and 
effective use of state resources.65 
Saudi Arabia’s ﬁ  scal policy is conducted without 
any implicit or explicit ﬁ  scal rule, leaving the 
executive with a very high level of discretion 
over public expenditure (see also above). 
Table 10 summarises the main features of the four 
countries concerning oil price assumptions in the 
budget, OSSFs and ﬁ  scal rules. The practices of 
the four (as well as other) oil-exporting countries 
indicate that these instruments are separate, 
i.e. can be used in isolation. For example, an 
OSSF can be established without transfers into 
or withdrawals from the fund being guided by 
any rule. Such full discretion is likely to sharply 
reduce the value of an oil fund in fostering ﬁ  scal 
discipline. On the other hand, in principle, a 
strict ﬁ  scal rule is feasible without establishing 
an OSSF as a separate entity or account. It 
Boﬁ  t (2007). 65 
Table 10 Overview of key budgetary institutions in selected oil-exporting countries
Algeria Nigeria Russia Saudi Arabia
Oil price assumption 
in the budget
USD 37 (2008) 
USD 37 (2009)




Not ofﬁ  cially released. 
Private sector estimates: 
approx. 




“Fonds de Régulation 
des Recettes” 
(since 2000) 
Primarily a stabilisation 
function 
(USD 50 billion)
“Excess Crude Oil 
account” (since 2004) 
Stabilisation function 
(USD 17.3 billion)
1) “Reserve Fund” 
Stabilisation function 
(USD 137 billion) 
2) “Future Generations 
Fund” Savings function 
(USD 88 billion) 
(The fund established 






(USD 5.3 billion) 
The bulk of foreign 
assets that are not 
foreign exchange 
reserves in the 
narrow sense are 
managed by SAMA 
(USD 405 billion).
Fiscal rule Oil revenues above 
the budgeted level 
are transferred to 
the oil fund.
Oil revenues above 
the budgeted level 
are transferred to the 
oil fund. Under the 
constitution, all tiers of 
government (federal, 
state, and local) share 
oil revenues. An MTFS 
includes targets for the 
non-oil primary deﬁ  cit.
Oil revenues above 
the budgeted level 
are transferred to 
the oil fund.
None
Sources: National authorities and Middle East Economic Survey (MEES).
Notes: Data on the amounts in the respective funds are end-2007 for Algeria and Nigeria, end-2008 for Russia and September 2008 for 
Saudi Arabia.47
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RESPONSES appears most effective, however, to combine 
the instruments in a consistent manner by, for 
example, establishing an explicit ﬁ  scal  rule 
guiding transfers into and withdrawals from 
a transparent and well-governed oil fund. Oil 
price assumptions can play a role in designing 
the ﬁ  scal rule, in particular if targeting non-oil 
budget balances to non-oil GDP is technically 
too challenging or is seen as not sufﬁ  ciently 
transparent in the speciﬁ  c context of a country.
Box 5
TWO EXAMPLES OF SUCCESSFUL NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: NORWAY AND BOTSWANA 
While resource-rich countries are often under-performers compared to other countries 
(see Section 2), some are seen as exceptions to “the rule” and have managed to avoid the 
“resource curse”. One is Norway, an oil/gas rich industrialised country, and another is Botswana, 
a southern African diamond-rich developing country, i.e. two countries at very different levels of 
economic development. 
Norway
Norway is the world’s ﬁ  fth largest oil exporter, the world’s third largest gas exporter and, like 
most other industrialised countries, faces a ﬁ  scal challenge related to the ageing of its population. 
Norway’s oil production peaked in 2002 and reserves are relatively limited. The ﬁ  scal policy 
framework currently in place is effective and conducive to ﬁ  scal discipline. The ﬁ  scal framework 
includes an explicit ﬁ  scal rule based on the structural non-oil budget balance and a transparent 
sovereign wealth fund (the Government Pension Fund-Global, GPF-G). It was established in 
1990 under the name Government Petroleum Fund, but political pressures to spend more of 
the oil revenues led to its renaming in 2006, as the GPF-G is explicitly meant to ﬁ  nance future 
pension payments. The GPF-G is the second largest SWF in the world (USD 396.5 billion at 
end-2007) and is charged with investing Norway’s oil and gas revenues for future generations. 
The  ﬁ   scal rule adopted in 2001 is aimed at keeping the central government structural 
non-oil deﬁ  cit at 4% of the assets of the GPF-G. Put differently, only the expected real return 
of the fund (based on a conservative assumption) can normally be transferred to the central 
government budget and be used for expenditure. Deviations from the 4% ﬁ  scal rule have been 
frequent since its inception and are allowed under certain circumstances, as in 2002-03 when 
the fund was negatively impacted by the stock market decline (Jafarov and Leigh, 2007). In 
2007 the government allowed the fund to increase the portion of money invested in stocks to 
60% from 40%. The fund has expanded rapidly in the past few years as oil prices rallied to 
record levels and will eventually invest 10% of its money in real estate and 5% in private equity. 
Notwithstanding frequent deviations from the ﬁ  scal rule, it is seen as having been successful 
in promoting ﬁ  scal discipline and macroeconomic stability (see Chart 13), which has also been 
supported by Norway’s inﬂ  ation targeting framework. Norway’s success in managing natural 
resource wealth can not solely be attributed to the ﬁ  scal rule and the oil fund as such, but their 
successful implementation and the relatively high degree of ﬁ  scal restraint over the past years 
may well be an expression of a number of factors that distinguish Norway from other major oil 
exporters. A high level of income and human development indicators, a developed infrastructure 
and a relatively diversiﬁ  ed economy reduce the development-related spending needs. Mature 
institutions and a high level of governance in general (see Chart in Box 2) help to contain 48
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primarily distribution-related spending pressures. Furthermore, relatively limited oil and gas 
reserves strengthen the case for saving oil revenues for future generations and for sustaining 
public ﬁ  nances, in particular in view of an ageing population.
Botswana
Botswana is a country rich in diamonds (75% of exports) with the fastest growing income per 
capita in the world (9% per annum on average over the past 30 years). Botswana is predominantly 
tropical and is landlocked, which the literature sees as a disadvantage (Bloom and Sachs, 1998). 
In the mid-1990s GDP per capita was around a third of that of the euro area, and since 2005 
it has been more than half (see Chart). With only 5% of the land being arable and with water 
shortage being a perennial constraint, agriculture-based growth was never an option (Basu and 
Srinivasan, 2002). The economic achievements are particularly striking because diamond wealth 
is more often than not associated with rent-seeking behaviour, eventually leading to conﬂ  ict 
to control revenues (e.g. in Angola, Congo and Sierra Leone). Botswana is the world’s largest 
diamond producer and has enjoyed democracy and elections on a regular basis since independence 
in 1966, although the same party has always remained in power under the leadership of three 
presidents. In addition to the maintenance of a relatively high level of governance in general, the 
success of Botswana in advancing from the group of the world’s poorest countries to the group 
of upper-middle income countries is due to a business-friendly environment (e.g. low tax rates) 
and to prudent ﬁ  scal management, with an implicit rule whereby diamond revenue is used to 
ﬁ  nance “investment expenditure”, which is deﬁ  ned as development expenditure and recurrent 
spending on education and health. In 1966 Botswana established a diamond mining revenues 
fund under the management of the central bank which was worth USD 6.8 billion at end-2007, of 
which 80% is accounted for by the “Pula Fund”, which is invested in long-term assets, and 20% 
is accounted for by a more traditional “Liquidity Fund”, comprising foreign exchange reserves 
in a narrow sense, which is invested in the money market and short-term bonds. Prudent ﬁ  scal 
policy has been key for channelling diamond 
revenues into capital investment, with the 
government investing in a transparent way in 
infrastructure, education and health. Botswana 
ranks well above the average of middle income 
countries in terms of World Bank governance 
indicators and is not far from high-income 
countries. The success of Botswana is due 
to the adoption of good policies which have 
promoted investment and the socially efﬁ  cient 
exploitation of resource rents (Acemoglu 
et al, 2001). As in the case of Norway, it 
is not the speciﬁ   c institutions like funds or 
ﬁ  scal rules per se, but their embedment in an 
environment of good governance and high 
quality institutions in general that allows them 
to achieve their positive effects. The fact that 
such an environment – unlike in the case of 
Norway – has been created in an African 
country with an initially low level of economic 
development is particularly noteworthy. 
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Macroeconomic developments in oil-exporting 
countries over the past few years have been 
favourable in view of high and rising oil prices 
until mid-2008, and have been characterised 
by buoyant economic growth (contrasting with 
relatively weak performance in the past, which 
is often attributed to the “resource curse”) and 
large current account and ﬁ  scal surpluses. While 
in past decades oil exporters fared relatively well 
with regard to inﬂ  ation, compared to emerging 
market and developing economies in general, 
rising inﬂ   ationary pressure has emerged as a 
mounting challenge in most countries in recent 
years, with monetary policy being constrained 
in tackling this challenge as a result of the 
prevailing exchange rate regimes. This has 
left  ﬁ  scal policy to carry the main burden of 
macroeconomic stabilisation.
The macroeconomic backdrop of oil-exporting 
countries is expected to change compared 
to previous years, as oil prices have fallen 
signiﬁ  cantly since their peaks in July 2008 in 
the wake of the intensiﬁ   cation of the global 
ﬁ   nancial turmoil and as the global economy 
has entered into a downturn. This will probably 
dampen oil exporters’ growth, curb inﬂ  ationary 
pressure and reduce current account and ﬁ  scal 
surpluses in 2009 and, depending on the length 
and depth of the downturn, possibly also after 
2009. Thus recent global developments have 
brought up a different set of economic and ﬁ  scal 
issues. However, medium-term projections of 
global oil supply and demand support the notion 
that oil prices will rise again, i.e. the issues 
explored in respect of the past few years will 
remain relevant over the medium-term horizon. 
Fiscal policy in oil-exporting countries in recent 
years has been expansionary, which has been 
masked by high ﬁ   scal surpluses, pointing to 
the competing considerations and objectives 
which  ﬁ   scal policy has been facing. These 
are to some extent the result of the speciﬁ  c 
long and short-term challenges of ﬁ  scal policy 
in resource-rich countries, owing to the fact 
that oil revenues are exhaustible, volatile, 
uncertain and originate from external demand. 
The major competing considerations in the 
short run have been, on one hand, cyclical, 
i.e. containing inﬂ  ation, which calls for ﬁ  scal 
restraint, and, on the other hand, primarily 
distribution-related considerations (pressures 
to immediately redistribute oil revenues to 
the general population), development-related 
spending needs in, for example, the areas of 
physical and social infrastructure (in view of 
the development level of most oil exporters) 
and international considerations (oil revenue 
recycling, in particular in the context of global 
imbalances), which call for ﬁ  scal  expansion. 
In the longer run, ﬁ   scal restraint and the 
accumulation of ﬁ   nancial assets, i.e. saving 
the bulk of recent windfall revenues would be 
warranted from an intergenerational and ﬁ  scal 
sustainability point of view, while the drive 
for economic diversiﬁ  cation in many countries 
requires public investment in, for example, 
infrastructure and education. Whether and under 
what circumstances ﬁ  nancial assets and physical 
assets can be regarded as substitutes is a key 
issue in this context. Calibrating ﬁ  scal policy 
in view of these considerations and objectives 
has been a major challenge for oil-exporting 
countries over the past few years.
In terms of policy responses over the past few 
years, major oil-exporting countries differ with 
regard to the emphasis laid on competing ﬁ  scal 
considerations and objectives. On one end of 
the policy spectrum is Norway, which has been 
characterised by a high degree of ﬁ  scal restraint 
and has saved most of the windfall revenues 
of past years, i.e. cyclical considerations 
(maintaining low inﬂ  ation) and intergenerational 
objectives have clearly dominated. On the other 
end of the spectrum are Venezuela and Iran, two 
countries which have embarked on particularly 
rapid ﬁ  scal expansion, with indications that the 
focus has been less on capital expenditure than 
in other major oil exporters, and which have 
faced high and persistent inﬂ  ation. 
The bulk of oil-exporting countries, including 
those under closer review in this paper 
(Algeria, Nigeria, Russia and Saudi Arabia), 50
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are somewhere between these poles. Spending 
has been signiﬁ  cantly increased, but ﬁ  nancial 
assets have also been accumulated. Spending 
increases have focused on what can be 
considered development-related spending 
needs, in particular in the areas of physical 
and social infrastructure, but primarily 
distribution-driven spending has also not been 
insigniﬁ  cant.  Inﬂ   ationary pressure has been 
increasing (i.e. cyclical considerations have not 
dominated), but the inﬂ  ationary impact of public 
spending has remained on the radar screen of 
authorities and precipitated some restraint. In 
Algeria and Saudi Arabia, the diversiﬁ  cation 
motive has been particularly strong, as reﬂ  ected 
in their massive investment programmes, given 
the very high dependence on hydrocarbon 
revenues and fast growing populations in 
these two countries. In Russia, which has a 
more diversiﬁ   ed economy and a shrinking 
population, diversiﬁ  cation appears to be less of 
an objective. Saving for future generations has 
been a relevant consideration, but also primarily 
distribution-related considerations seem to have 
played a signiﬁ  cant role in spending decisions, 
as evidenced in the election year 2007. Among 
major oil-exporting countries, Russia has been 
most affected by the intensiﬁ  cation of the global 
ﬁ  nancial turmoil since September 2008. This is 
due to, among other things, weaknesses in the 
banking and corporate sectors, as reﬂ  ected also 
in a downgrading of sovereign debt.
Possible ways to mitigate conﬂ  icts  between 
competing objectives and considerations at a 
time of rising oil prices include improving the 
structure of public spending (i.e. focusing in 
particular on capital spending, which alleviates 
bottlenecks in the economy, while containing 
current expenditure) and optimising the 
phasing of public spending (i.e. prioritising 
capital spending targeted at bottlenecks and 
at enhancing the absorptive capacity of the 
economy). Rebalancing the macroeconomic 
policy mix by tightening monetary policy in 
times of buoyant economic growth could also 
help avoid the overburdening of ﬁ  scal policy 
with competing objectives. This would require, 
however, a modiﬁ  cation of prevailing exchange 
rate regimes by allowing for more exchange rate 
ﬂ  exibility. Apart from technical impediments in 
some countries to running a different monetary 
and exchange rate regime, concerns about high 
volatility and “Dutch disease” tends to hold 
back authorities from opting for more exchange 
rate ﬂ  exibility, in particular as oil is priced in 
US dollars in international markets.
Global economic and ﬁ  nancial  developments 
in the second half of 2008 and the concomitant 
fall in oil prices have mitigated inﬂ  ationary 
pressures in oil-exporting countries, as 
elsewhere, and thus conﬂ   icts between the 
competing ﬁ  scal objectives. In the short run, the 
sudden, sharp fall in oil prices has brought up 
a set of new issues, in particular as to whether 
to continue with spending programmes initiated 
over the past years or to adjust spending to 
dampened revenue prospects. To the extent 
that spending has been identiﬁ   ed as useful, 
e.g. for diversifying the economy or upgrading 
infrastructure, continuing with spending 
programmes would help both to stabilise the 
domestic economy and to contribute to global 
stabilisation efforts. Most oil exporters are in a 
position to do so given that over the past years 
they have brought down public debt to low levels 
and have accumulated – sometimes large – 
foreign assets. These can be used to bridge a 
period of temporarily low oil prices and to avoid 
pro-cyclicality of ﬁ  scal policy. Pro-cyclicality is 
a key challenge for ﬁ  scal policy in oil-exporting 
countries in view of large, unpredictable swings 
in oil prices; a challenge which over the past few 
years has presented two very different sides. 
If oil prices were to remain at relatively low 
levels compared to the past few years for a 
protracted period of time, oil exporters would 
have to adjust ﬁ  scal policy or risk accumulating 
large public debt again. Such adjustment could 
take place on the expenditure and the revenue 
side. On the expenditure side, current outlays 
and expenditure on marginal investment projects 
could be reduced without impeding longer term 
growth prospects or diversiﬁ  cation  efforts. 51
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On the revenue side, the introduction or 
expansion of taxes could be envisaged to ensure 
ﬁ   scal sustainability. Broadening the revenue 
basis by developing an efﬁ   cient tax system 
would anyway be beneﬁ  cial over the medium 
term, reducing the dependence of public budgets 
on oil receipts and enhancing the control of 
authorities over public revenues, which so far 
are largely beyond their control. 
Institutional responses to the speciﬁ  c challenges 
for  ﬁ   scal policy in oil-exporting countries 
traditionally involve basing budgets on 
conservative oil price assumptions and, more 
recently, the establishment of oil stabilisation 
and savings funds and, in few cases, explicit 
ﬁ  scal rules. While each of these responses has 
its merits and its drawbacks, none is a panacea 
to address the speciﬁ   c long and short-run 
challenges. Norway and Botswana are examples 
of resource-rich countries at very different levels 
of economic development demonstrating that 
indeed speciﬁ  c institutions such as stabilisation 
and savings funds and ﬁ  scal rules can be helpful 
in managing natural resource revenues. Nigeria’s 
recent experience with a ﬁ  scal rule also seems 
to have been encouraging. Nevertheless, the 
examples of other countries with proﬂ  igate 
spending notwithstanding the existence of oil 
funds underline that such institutions in isolation 
are not sufﬁ   cient to address the ﬁ  scal  issues 
prevalent in oil-exporting countries. While they 
can be helpful devices, the desired effects only 
seem to be realised if the quality of a country’s 
institutions and level of governance in general 
are conducive to responsible ﬁ  scal conduct.52
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